survit – -Translation – Keybot Dictionary

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Show textShow cached sourceOpen source URL	Je partage toutefois la conclusion de mon collègue le juge La Forest que la politique de retraite obligatoire de l'université relève de la portée de l'article premier et survit à un examen fondé sur la Charte.
Compare text pagesCompare HTM pagesOpen source URLOpen target URLDefine csc.lexum.org as primary domain	However, I am in agreement with the conclusion reached by my colleague Justice La Forest that the mandatory retirement policy of the University comes within the scope of s. 1 and thus survives Charter scrutiny.

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Show textShow cached sourceOpen source URL	46 Avec le plus grand respect, je suis d’avis que ce raisonnement est mal fondé, dans la mesure où sa proposition essentielle ne survit pas à une interprétation de l’ensemble de la législation pertinente.
Compare text pagesCompare HTM pagesOpen source URLOpen target URLDefine csc.lexum.org as primary domain	46 With the greatest respect, it is my opinion that this reasoning is ill-founded to the extent that the interpretation of the relevant legislation as a whole does not support its essential premise.  In my judgment, there was simply no removal from the judicial office held by the respondent judges in this case.

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Je suis donc d'avis de conclure que le par. 93(3) constitue effectivement une reconnaissance de la compétence législative conférée par la disposition liminaire de l'art. 93, qui survit à l'application du par. 93(1).

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81.              I therefore would conclude that s. 93(3) does indeed introduce a recognition of a legislative power granted in the opening words of s. 93 and surviving the operations of s. 93(1). This legislative power in the province is not subject to regulation by other parts of the Constitution in any way which would be tantamount to its repeal. The Charter would not be available to disallow the implementation of s. 93(1), or legislation for the protection of the rights embedded by s. 93(1), or legislation contemplated in s. 93(3).

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Je crois qu’il est plus exact de dire que la procédure est simplement suspendue en attendant l’issue de la contestation devant la cour supérieure; la compétence sera effectivement perdue si la demande de prohibition et d’annulation est accueillie mais, dans le cas contraire, elle survit.

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The author goes on to say that the inferior court is deprived of its jurisdiction to resume the proceedings as, after the removal, nothing is left before it. I think it more accurate to say that the proceedings are merely suspended pending the outcome of the contest in the superior court; jurisdiction will indeed be lost if the application to prohibit and quash is successful but, if not, it survives.

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Je signale ici que la seconde épouse a eu un enfant du de cujus; cet enfant survit au de cujus mais n’était pas inclus dans le testament, sauf réalisation d’un événement (le décès de la mère dans les 30 jours suivant la mort du de cujus), qui ne s’est pas produit.

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The deceased’s estate of some $166,000 included insurance policies of some $81,000 of which the second wife was the beneficiary, and these were charged with liabilities of some $17,000. In net terms, it appears that the second wife was entitled, upon the deceased’s death, to about $64,000 under policies of insurance on his life and to some $60,000 under his will. Furlong C.J., who heard the application under The Family Relief Act, made an order for payment of $20,000 to the applicant. His order referred only to the applicant and did not embrace her two children. I note here that the second wife had a child by the deceased and this child survived him but was not included in the benefits under his will, save in an event (the death of her mother within 30 days after the deceased’s death) which did not occur.

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124 L.n.t. Le caractère impératif de la norme signifie plutôt que toute disposition conventionnelle incompatible avec l’interdiction du congédiement sans cause juste et suffisante d’un salarié justifiant de deux ans de service continu est réputée non écrite, ce qui modifie le contenu de la convention collective. Le reste du contrat ou de la convention, quant à lui, survit à l’invalidation de la clause (art. 62 et 64 C.t. et art. 1438 du Code civil du Québec, L.Q. 1991, ch. 64).

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[42] I cannot therefore accept the respondent’s view that the only effect of the public order nature of the legislation in the instant cases is to preclude the parties from stipulating that an employee may not exercise the recourse provided for in s. 124 A.L.S.  Instead, the mandatory nature of the standard means that any provision of an agreement that is inconsistent with the prohibition against the dismissal without good and sufficient cause of an employee credited with two years of uninterrupted service will be deemed unwritten, which alters the content of the collective agreement.  The rest of the contract or agreement will survive a finding that the clause is invalid (ss. 62 and 64 L.C. and art. 1438 of the Civil Code of Québec, S.Q. 1991, c. 64).  It is from this perspective that the collective agreement as altered by the standards of public order established in the legislation must therefore be examined to determine whether an employee may apply the agreement to contest his or her dismissal before a grievance arbitrator.

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2b) soit, par exemple, si les documents auxquels on demande l’accès sont protégés par un privilège ou si leur divulgation interférerait avec le bon fonctionnement de l’institution gouvernementale en cause. Si la demande survit à cette deuxième étape, le demandeur établit que l’al.

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[33] This leads us to more detailed comments on the scope of s. 2(b) protection where the issue is access to documents in government hands.  To demonstrate that there is expressive content in accessing such documents, the claimant must establish that the denial of access effectively precludes meaningful commentary.  If the claimant can show this, there is a prima facie case for the production of the documents in question.  But even if this prima facie case is established, the claim may be defeated by factors that remove s. 2(b) protection, e.g. if the documents sought are protected by privilege or if production of the documents would interfere with the proper functioning of the governmental institution in question. If the claim survives this second step, then the claimant establishes that s. 2(b) is engaged.  The only remaining question is whether the government action infringes that protection.

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C’est pourquoi il n’y a rien à tirer des arrêts que l’on nous a cités touchant de tels cas. Celui qui survit peut subir un dommage important du fait d’un choc très court, parce qu’il peut arriver qu’il en ressente des effets préjudiciables le reste de ses jours.

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The unfortunate victims died in the accident. Their suffering and anguish can only have been experienced and caused them harm up to the time of their death. Their situation is in no way comparable to that of persons who might have survived. For this reason the decisions on such cases cited before the Court are of no assistance. One who survives may sustain great injury from a very brief shock, because he may ultimately feel the harmful effects for the rest of his life. Here the harmful effects could only have been felt for an extremely short time. All that appellants’ counsel felt he could say in this regard was that more than fractions of a second were involved. It is clear from his own allegations, however, that it could at most have been a few minutes. In my view, this necessarily leads to the conclusion reached by the trial judge, that these were victims who died “almost instantaneously”, as in Driver et al v. Coca‑Cola.

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Compte tenu de ce qui précède, lorsqu'il a signé la renonciation, l'assuré n'a pu que consentir à la divulgation de ses dossiers médicaux à l'appelante, aux fins d'une enquête sur la cause de son décès, de manière à permettre à la compagnie d'assurances d'établir le droit à l'indemnité additionnelle en cas de décès accidentel, conformément aux dispositions de la police. Comme l'a fait remarquer le juge Malouf, il ne peut y avoir de doute que pareille renonciation survit au décès de l'assuré.

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In light of the foregoing, in signing the waiver, the insured could only but have consented to the release of his medical records to the appellant for the purpose of investigating the cause of his death so as to enable the insurance company to determine entitlement to the supplementary indemnity for accidental death according to the terms of the policy.  There can be no doubt, as Malouf J.A. observed, that such waiver survives the death of the insured.

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Curieux, parce que, n'eût été leur consignation dans les recueils, il aurait été difficile d'imaginer l'ingéniosité déployée dans l'invention de raisons "ex post facto" pour justifier une règle si simple et si ancienne [.  .  .]  Nous assistons au spectacle fascinant d'une règle fondamentale de preuve, dont l'existence repose sur des motifs pour le moins contestables, qui survit depuis deux siècles grâce à la force de certains dogmes artificiels ‑- affirmations totalement inconciliables les unes avec les autres, avec les faits de la vie et avec la règle elle‑même, mais constamment invoquées, avec toute l'assurance judiciaire, comme des formules magiques servant à dissiper le spectre du doute judiciaire.

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The record of judicial ratiocination defining the grounds and policy of this privilege forms one of the most curious and entertaining chapters of the law of evidence.  It is curious because the variety of ingenuity displayed, in the invention of reasons "ex post facto" for a rule so simple and so long accepted, could hardly have been believed but for the recorded utterances....  We behold the fantastic spectacle of a fundamental rule of evidence, which had only questionable reasons for existence, surviving nonetheless through two centuries upon the strength of certain artificial dogmas ‑‑ pronouncements wholly irreconcilable with each other, with the facts of life and with the rule itself, and yet repeatedly invoked, with smug judicial positiveness, like magic formulas to still the specter of forensic doubt.

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lmpossible de restreindre cet engagement aux seules transactions nées au moment du décès ou de la connaissance du décès. Telle que stipulée, la sûreté survit à son auteur et passe à ses héritiers (607, 1937 C.C.).

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Not only do we find no provision of the law under which the obligation is said to be extinguished by the surety's death or by the fact of knowledge of this event by the Bank, but we are dealing here with a contractual stipulation which has specifically provided for the event of death and continuance of the obligation against the heirs. Like the surety, they will be guarantors. Like him, they will be able to revoke the suretyship for the future by sending a written notice to the branch of the Bank where the letters were prepared. The heirs collectively take the place of the deceased. The obligation continues indefinitely in time, as an accessory to present and future debts. It is not possible to limit this obligation solely to transactions which have arisen at the time of the death or with knowledge of it. As stipulated, the surety survives his principal and passes to his heirs (607, 1937 C.C.).

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Chauret[12], citée dans le mémoire de C.A.C. Realty; la Cour d’appel décide qu’une hypothèque survit à une clause résolutoire antérieure lorsqu’elle est créée avec le concours du bénéficiaire de la clause; la Cour maintient donc une opposition à fin de charge en faveur du créancier hypothécaire.

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The decision in Newman v. Archambault seems to stand alone. The only other decision which seems at first sight to be along the same lines is Boileau v. Chauret[12], cited in C.A.C. Realty’s factum; in that case the Court of Appeal held that a hypothec survives a prior resolutory clause when it is created with the approval of the beneficiary of the clause; the Court thus upheld an opposition to secure charges in favour of the hypothecary creditor. However, the case involved a title ratification procedure, which disappeared from the Code of Civil Procedure in 1965, perhaps because it had in practice become obsolete with the advent of registration. This procedure resembled the voluntary sale of the old law and, like it, was governed by rules which differed in part from those prescribed for forced sales. Bourjon alludes to one of these differences under LXXXVIII cited above.

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quelconque des enfants au premier degré de la donatrice lui survit mais décède avant d’avoir atteint l’âge de vingt-cinq ans et laisse des enfants légitimes, ces enfants recevront la part de leur père ou mère prédécédé et, à défaut de descendance, cette part accroîtra aux autres enfants au premier degré de la donatrice et aux enfants de ses enfants au premier degré prédécédés, en parts égales par souches.

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survive her but die before reaching the age of twenty-five years leaving lawful issue, such issue shall take the share of their deceased parent and failing issue the same will accrue to the other children in the first degree of the Donor and the issue of predeceased children in the first degree equally by roots. The shares of all such issue of the Donor’s children in the first degree shall be paid over to them as they respectively reach the age of twenty-five years. During the minority of all children and their issue herein referred to the Trustee shall use for their welfare the revenues from their respective shares, in such amounts and through such channels as the Trustee in its sole discretion may decide, and after reaching majority each beneficiary shall be paid his or her share of revenues direct. In addition such parts of the capital of their respective shares as the Trustee in its sole discretion may deem advisable may be paid to or used for such beneficiary from time to time to provide for illness, accidents, emergencies or other needs of a serious nature.

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J. (J.T.), [1990] 2 R.C.S. 755, selon laquelle la protection du par. 56(2) survit à un renvoi à un tribunal pour adultes, étant donné que la déclaration dans cette affaire a été faite à un moment où l'accusé relevait de la compétence du tribunal pour adolescents.

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Subject to the National Defence Act, Parliament has entrusted the youth court with exclusive jurisdiction over anyone who has the status of a young person and that person is entitled to all the benefits of the Act until such time as the matter is disposed of by the youth court or the person is transferred to adult court.  (This does not contradict the assumption in R. v. J. (J.T.), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 755, that the protection of s. 56(2) survives a transfer to adult court, since the statement in that case was taken at a time when the accused was under the jurisdiction of the youth court.)  The latter alternative is likewise under the control of the youth court and is available whenever the provisions of the Young Offenders Act are found inappropriate for dealing with the circumstances of the young person, having regard to the factors stated in the Act, which include the age, maturity, character and background of the young person, the adequacy of the Young Offenders Act and the Criminal Code that would apply to the young person in the event of a transfer and any factor the court considers relevant.

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Toutes les autres contestations constitutionnelles soulevées dans cette affaire sont rejetées. Puisque seule la première exigence de l’al. 258(1)c) survit à l’arrêt St‑Onge Lamoureux de la Cour, je n’examinerai que les modifications telles qu’elles sont à la suite de cet arrêt.

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[14] In St-Onge Lamoureux, I conclude that the first requirement that the approved instrument was malfunctioning or was operated improperly, as set out in s. 258(1)(c) and qualified by s. 258(1)(d.01), infringes the right to be presumed innocent protected by s. 11(d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, but that the infringement is justified under s. 1. I also find in that case that the other two requirements of s. 258(1)(c) — (1) that a causal connection be demonstrated between the malfunctioning or improper operation of the instrument and the determination that the blood alcohol level of the accused exceeded the legal limit, and (2) that further evidence be submitted to demonstrate that the blood alcohol level of the accused did not exceed the legal limit — unjustifiably infringe s. 11(d) of the Charter.  All the other constitutional challenges in that case are rejected. Since only the first requirement of s. 258(1)(c) survives the Court’s decision in St-Onge Lamoureux, I will address the Amendments only as they stand following that decision.

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Notre Cour s’est, en effet, déjà prononcée à deux reprises contre la transmissibilité du recours en dommages pour perte de vie ou abrégement de vie lorsque la victime décède immédiatement en raison de l’acte fautif ou y survit quelques heures sans, toutefois, reprendre conscience avant de mourir: le droit à la vie prenant fin avec la vie de la victime, ce recours n’est pas susceptible d’entrer dans le patrimoine de la victime et ne saurait donc être transmis à ses héritiers.

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56 Rather, the appellant is asking us to consider the death of any person to be a prejudice that is objectively compensable under Quebec civil law, or in other words, that is the basis for a right to compensation regardless of whether the deceased was aware of his or her death.  Accordingly we are also asked to reconsider, in light of the Charter, the past judgments of this Court that bar such compensation.  This Court has already held on two occasions that an action for damages for loss of life or shortening of life cannot be transmitted where the victim dies immediately as a result of the wrongful act or survives a few hours without regaining consciousness before dying:  since the right to life is extinguished when the victim dies, this remedy cannot become part of the victim’s patrimony and, therefore, cannot be transmitted to his or her heirs.  In Driver v. Coca‑Cola Ltd., supra, at pp. 204-5 and 207-8, the majority of the Court, per Taschereau J., explained the rule (upheld by unanimous judgment of this Court in Pantel v. Air Canada, supra, at pp. 478‑79) as follows:

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À cet égard, que l’appelante mette l’accent sur l’abrégement de la vie de son fils, qui a survécu quatre heures à sa blessure, plutôt que la perte de sa vie m’apparaît sans conséquence en l’espèce. En effet, ces deux chefs de dommages sont indissociables lorsque la victime meurt instantanément en raison de l’acte fautif ou y survit sans pour autant reprendre conscience avant de décéder.

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71 It is indisputable that the respondent Gosset’s wrongful conduct resulted in unlawful interference with Anthony’s right to life.  However, the Charter is no more capable than the general law of protecting the right to life once a person has died.  Thus, for the judicial policy considerations set out earlier, no compensation can be awarded in respect of the appellant’s claim for interference with her son’s right to life under either art. 1053 C.C.L.C. or ss. 1 and 49 of the Charter.  The fact that the appellant stressed the shortening of the life of her son, who survived for four hours after being injured, rather than the loss of his life, is in my view not relevant here.  These two heads of damage are indissociable where the victim dies instantaneously owing to the wrongful act or survives without regaining consciousness before dying.

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Show textShow cached sourceOpen source URL	[TRADUCTION] Le pouvoir de désignation ne peut exister que si Kielty ne survit pas au testateur. Comme, de fait, il lui a survécu, l’occasion d’exercer ce pouvoir ne s’est pas présentée et la distribution est régie par les mots suivant l’expression «à défaut de telle désignation».
Compare text pagesCompare HTM pagesOpen source URLOpen target URLDefine csc.lexum.org as primary domain	The power of appointment is only to be created if Kielty does not survive the testator. As he did so survive, the occasion for the exercise of the power did not arise and hence, distribution is governed by the words following the phrase “failing appointment”.

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Le droit à la vie prenant fin avec le décès de la victime, un recours en dommages pour perte de vie ou abrégement de vie, lorsque la victime décède immédiatement en raison de l’acte fautif ou y survit quelques heures sans toutefois reprendre conscience avant de mourir,  n’est pas susceptible d’entrer dans le patrimoine de la victime et ne saurait donc être transmis à ses héritiers.

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Since the right to life is extinguished when the victim dies, an action for damages for loss of life or shortening of life, where the victim dies immediately as a result of the wrongful act or survives a few hours without regaining consciousness before dying, cannot become part of the victim’s patrimony and, therefore, cannot be transmitted to his or her heirs.  The right to life guaranteed by s. 1 of the Quebec Charter does not require a change to this principle of non‑transmissibility.  The Charter has not created an autonomous system of civil liability and, although it has helped clarify the scope of fundamental rights in Quebec law, it did not create the right to life, which has always been valued and recognized in Quebec civil law.  The major judicial policy considerations underlying the judge‑made principle that the right to claim damages for loss of life or of life expectancy cannot be transmitted to one’s heirs ‑‑ the most significant of which is that it is extremely difficult to quantify life ‑‑ have continued to be just as relevant since the advent of the Charter.  Loss of life or of life expectancy, by its very nature, constitutes a unique prejudice which justifies departing from the civil liability rule of restitutio in integrum.  Moreover, in light of the basically remedial function of the civil liability system, it is hard to justify compensating a prejudice the very nature of which will systematically ensure that the victim is unable to gain any benefit therefrom.  Thus, no compensation can be awarded in respect of the appellant’s claim for interference with her son’s right to life under either art. 1053 C.C.L.C. or ss. 1 and 49 of the Charter.  The refusal to award compensation does not depreciate the right to life.  Finally, the victim’s right to personal security was not interfered with independently of his right to life when G trained his weapon upon him in the aim of keeping him under control at a distance.

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Show textShow cached sourceOpen source URL	[TRADUCTION] de payer à John Douglas Wharton Ford, d’Australie, à condition qu’il vive à la date de mon décès, la somme de $50,000; si ledit John Douglas Wharton Ford ne me survit pas, ladite somme tombera dans le résidu de ma succession pour en faire partie.
Compare text pagesCompare HTM pagesOpen source URLOpen target URLDefine csc.lexum.org as primary domain	to pay to John Douglas Wharton Ford of Australia if living at the date of my death the sum of $50,000.00; PROVIDED that if the said John Douglas Wharton Ford shall not survive me the said fund shall fall into and form part of the residue of my estate.

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Attorney General of Ontario, [1924] R.C.S. 331. Selon moi, ce n'est pas le bon cas pour déterminer la mesure dans laquelle l'arrêt Smith survit en fonction des opinions plus libérales relatives à la qualité pour agir dans l'intérêt public.

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My colleague Justice L'Heureux-Dubé is of the opinion that the appellants satisfy the test for standing set out in Smith v. Attorney General of Ontario, [1924] S.C.R. 331.  In my opinion, this is not the proper case for deciding the extent to which Smith survives in view of the more liberal views relating to public interest standing.  The appellants have not presented any evidence as to how they themselves have suffered exceptional prejudice under the Smith test.

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Show textShow cached sourceOpen source URL	40 Malgré les désaccords qui sont survenus à propos de l’arrêt Cummer-Yonge, demeure toujours bien vivante dans la jurisprudence canadienne la distinction voulant que les garants soient tenus à une obligation secondaire qui disparaît en cas de résiliation du bail par le syndic de faillite et que les cédants soient tenus à une obligation principale qui survit à cette résiliation.
Compare text pagesCompare HTM pagesOpen source URLOpen target URLDefine csc.lexum.org as primary domain	40 Despite the division over Cummer-Yonge, the distinction between guarantors as having secondary obligations that disappear when a lease is disclaimed by a trustee in bankruptcy, and assignors as having primary obligations that survive a disclaimer, thrives in Canadian case law.

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Les circonstances de cette cause ne permettent pas toutefois à la Cour de disposer du pourvoi sur une base beaucoup plus large, comme le demande le procureur général du Canada, savoir: la Constitution habilite-t-elle le Parlement du Canada à prescrire que l’obligation de secours survit indéfiniment à la dissolution du lien matrimonial, ce que le Parlement aurait fait dans la Loi sur le divorce.

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However, the circumstances of this case do not enable the Court to deal with the appeal on a broader basis, as it was asked to do by the Attorney General of Canada, namely, to determine whether the Constitution empowers the Parliament of Canada to prescribe that the obligation to provide assistance indefinitely survives the dissolution of the marriage bond and that this is what was done in the Divorce Act. Since it has held that the jurisdiction of the Superior Court originates in s. 11 of the Divorce Act, the Court does not need to reply to the question as to the constitutionality of arts. 212 and 213 of the Civil Code. There are not sufficient reasons for this Court to give an opinion on a question that, in the final analysis, it is not necessary to resolve.

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19 Selon le premier juge, en suspendant l’intimé comme elle l’a fait, l’appelante le dépouillait de toute dignité et manquait à son obligation de fournir le travail prévu et d’en permettre l’exécution, contrairement à l’art. 2087 C.c.Q.  Il affirme que le contrat ne survit pas en principe à de telles dérogations, qui équivalent à une résiliation unilatérale.

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19 In the trial judge’s opinion, when the appellant suspended the respondent as it did, it stripped him of his dignity and breached its obligation to provide the work agreed to and allow the performance of that work, contrary to art. 2087 C.C.Q.  The trial judge said that, as a rule, contracts do not survive deviations of this kind, which are equivalent to unilateral resiliation.  However, he held that in the circumstances it mattered little whether this was a resiliation followed by renewal of the contract, or a simple suspension of the contract.  The respondent had suffered substantial damage because of the appellant’s failure to perform its obligation to provide the work and pay the appellant.

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Show textShow cached sourceOpen source URL	Le reliquat de la succession est ensuite réparti ainsi: une rente viagère à la mère du testateur, avec pouvoir d’entamer le capital à son bénéfice, un legs particulier à son père s’il survit à sa mère et divers legs à des bénéficiaires désignés.
Compare text pagesCompare HTM pagesOpen source URLOpen target URLDefine csc.lexum.org as primary domain	There followed a disposition of the residue by way of the income for life to the testator’s mother, with power to encroach on capital for her benefit, a specific legacy to his father if he should survive the mother and then a division of the residuary capital among named beneficiaries.

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Show textShow cached sourceOpen source URL	[. . .]  Cela nous amène donc à examiner la question de savoir si les retraités, comme le prétend le syndicat, jouissent à l'égard des avantages demandés en vertu de l'art. 60, d'un droit acquis qui survit à la convention collective.
Compare text pagesCompare HTM pagesOpen source URLOpen target URLDefine csc.lexum.org as primary domain	For the arbitrator, then, the key issue was whether some right in favour of the retirees had vested during the currency of the collective agreement.  On this point, the arbitrator turned first to the terms of the collective agreement, and after a careful analysis he concluded that Article 60(ix) was intended to vest benefits with the retirees.  He stated:

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56 J’estime que l’aspect du traité qui survit n’est pas la promesse littérale d’établir des maisons de troc, mais un droit -- issu de ce traité -- qui permet de continuer à pouvoir se procurer les biens nécessaires en pratiquant la chasse et la pêche et en échangeant le produit de ces activités traditionnelles, sous réserve des restrictions qui peuvent être justifiées suivant le critère établi dans Badger.

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56 My view is that the surviving substance of the treaty is not the literal promise of a truckhouse, but a treaty right to continue to obtain necessaries through hunting and fishing by trading the products of those traditional activities subject to restrictions that can be justified under the Badger test.

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Il importait d’abord à l’appelante d’établir que la règle ne s’appliquait pas; elle a réussi à le faire et ce n’est que subsidiairement que son avocat a préconisé que la règle ne soit plus suivie. De son côté, l’avocat des intimés a fait valoir que la règle, qui survit depuis si longtemps, devait être suivie par les tribunaux et qu’il incombe aux législatures de décider de son abolition.

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The appellant here was concerned primarily with establishing that the rule did not apply; in this he succeeded, and it was only in the alternative that its counsel urged that the rule no longer be followed. Counsel for the respondents took the position that the rule, having survived so long, should be followed by the Courts and it should be left to the various Legislatures to decide on its abolition. British Columbia itself recently moved to this end in the enactment on June 20, 1978, of the Conveyancing and Law of Property Act, which by s. 33 expressly abrogates the rule, but the Act has not as yet been proclaimed.

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Show textShow cached sourceOpen source URL	2. La décision de la Cour d'appel, qui renverse la Cour supérieure et une jurisprudence abondante, a pour effet de prescrire que l'obligation de secours entre ex-conjoints survit indéfiniment à la dissolution du lien matrimonial.
Compare text pagesCompare HTM pagesOpen source URLOpen target URLDefine csc.lexum.org as primary domain	2. The effect of the decision of the Court of Appeal, which reversed the Superior Court, and a considerable body of case law is that the support obligation between former spouses survives a dissolution of the marriage indefinitely.

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Zacks, le procureur général du Canada nous invite à disposer du pourvoi sur une base beaucoup plus large, savoir, que la Constitution habilite le Parlement du Canada à prescrire que l’obligation de secours survit indéfiniment à la dissolution du lien matrimonial et que c’est ce qu’il a fait dans la Loi sur le divorce.

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As in Zacks v. Zacks, the Attorney General of Canada asks that the Court deal with the appeal on a much broader basis, namely, that the constitution empowers the Parliament of Canada to prescribe that the obligation to provide assistance indefinitely survives the dissolution of the marriage bond and that this is what was done in the Divorce Act. The circumstances of this case do not enable us to express an opinion upon such general propositions, anymore than it was possible in Zacks v. Zacks.