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La Banque Royale du Canada (succursale canadienne) (« BRC » ou « prêteur »).
Royal Bank of Canada (Canadian branch) (“RBC” or “Lender”).
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1.    MAIL a déposé à la BRC une somme égale au prêt (environ 100 millions de dollars);
1.    MAIL placed on deposit with the RBC an amount equal to the Loan (approximately $100 million); and
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[40] L’autre disposition pertinente pour ce qui est du droit de la BRC de recouvrer auprès de la BNÉ l’argent qu’elle a payé par erreur est le par. 165(3) de la LLC, dont voici le texte :
[40] The other provision that is relevant to RBC’s right to recover the money it paid by mistake from BNS is s. 165(3) BEA. This provision reads as follows:
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Royal Bank of Canada Trust Company (Jersey) Limited (« RBC Jersey » ou « le fiduciaire ») est le fiduciaire de MACT et une filiale en propriété exclusive de BRC, constituée en personne morale sous le régime des lois du Jersey.
Royal Bank of Canada Trust Company (Jersey) Limited (“RBC Jersey” or “Trustee”) is the trustee of MACT and is a wholly owned subsidiary of RBC, incorporated in Jersey.
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[24] Selon le premier volet du critère établi dans Simms, la BRC a, à première vue, droit au recouvrement. Nul ne conteste en l’espèce que l’effet payé était un faux. Selon le par. 48(1) de la LLC, la signature contrefaite est sans effet; elle ne confère pas le droit d’acquitter la lettre de change ou d’obliger une partie à en effectuer le paiement.
[24] On the first step of the Simms test, RBC has a prima facie right to recover.  It is common ground that payment was made on the basis of a forged instrument.  According to s. 48(1) BEA, a forged signature is wholly inoperative. It does not create a right to give a discharge for the bill or to enforce payment. RBC made the payment before discovering that the drawer’s signatures were forged. BMP no longer disputes the fact that the instrument is a forgery, but it contends that RBC must bear the loss and that BNS was not entitled to restrain the funds and transfer them to RBC.  This argument goes to the second step of the test. At the first step, there is no basis for denying that RBC has a prima facie right to recover the funds.
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De même, les fonds visés en l’espèce n’ont pas perdu la leur. La BNÉ, en tant que banque d’encaissement, a reçu les fonds de la BRC par l’entremise du système de compensation et les a portés au crédit de BMP.
[84] In Hambrouck, the funds received through the clearing system by Farrow’s Bank, acting as the collecting bank, from the Banque Belge pour l’Étranger had not lost their “identity”. In the same way, the funds in the case at bar have not lost theirs.  BNS, acting as the collecting bank, received the funds from RBC through the clearing system and credited them to BMP. The asset traced by RBC is simply its own. It is not the chose in action or the account holders’s personal claim against BNS: R. M. Goode, “The Right to Trace and its Impact in Commercial Transactions — I” (1976), 92 L.Q. Rev. 360, at p. 380. The transactions that followed were all conducted by the recipient and persons related to it who received the money from BMP. Moreover, the fact that some of the accounts had prior balances is not a bar to recovery.  Not only were the balances not substantial  —  only one of the accounts contained over $100 —  but the withdrawals by the holders significantly exceeded the balances. It is also worth noting that BNS was both the drawee and the payees’ banker in all the transactions at issue, namely the transfers and payments from BMP’s account and to the related accounts. There was no hiatus like the one in Agip, and the holders of the related accounts were not third parties who had given consideration or changed their positions.
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[63] L’examen relatif au changement de situation exige qu’on détermine si le preneur s’est dessaisi des fonds. En l’espèce, la BNÉ, en sa qualité de banque d’encaissement, a reçu les fonds de la BRC pour le compte du preneur, BMP, et les a portés au crédit de celle‑ci.
[63] To conduct the change of position enquiry, it is necessary to determine whether the payee parted with the funds.  In this case, BNS, as the collecting bank, received the funds from RBC for the benefit of the payee, BMP, and credited BMP’s account.  Once the collecting bank receives the funds from the drawee and credits the payee, its role as a collecting bank is terminated.  It then becomes the holder of the funds under its contract with its customer.  It is settled law that a customer is a creditor of the bank when he or she deposits funds into an account and that the bank holds these funds as its own until the customer asks for repayment.  This principle has gone unquestioned since Foley v. Hill (1848), 2 H.L.C. 28, 9 E.R. 1002.  See Crawford and Falconbridge: Banking and Bills of Exchange (8th ed. 1986), vol. 1, at pp. 742‑43; Ogilvie, at p. 179.
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Toutes les conditions du recouvrement du paiement par erreur sont remplies. Comme la BNÉ pouvait à bon droit donner suite à la demande de la BRC visant la restitution des sommes payées par erreur de fait, l’argument du droit du tiers ne peut être retenu.
All the conditions for recovery of the payment made by mistake are met.  As BNS was entitled to give effect to RBC’s claim for restitution of the moneys paid under mistake of fact, the jus tertii argument fails.  The rightful owner had a legitimate claim against the recipient, and BNS had no duty to give preference to BMP.  BMP insisted on retaining the funds even though it had given no consideration for them and even though the fraud was beyond dispute.  BMP did not lose anything because the funds had to be returned to RBC.  BNS’s actions entailed no risk of curtailing the protection from which a holder in due course is entitled to benefit.  Finally, there are no policy considerations that would preclude BNS from responding to RBC’s common law right in this case.  [65-73]
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En ce qui concerne les fonds dans les comptes connexes, lorsque la BNÉ, en exécution des instructions de BMP, a transféré l’argent sur les comptes de 636651 B.C. Ltd., de M. Backman (compte chèques et compte d’épargne) et de M. Hashka, les fonds virés avaient clairement un lien avec le faux chèque que la BNÉ avait par erreur porté au compte de BMP. Les fonds utilisés pour les virements provenaient du compte de BMP. Le lien est donc établi avec les fonds que la BRC a utilisés pour payer le faux chèque.
[86] As Atkin L.J. mentioned in Hambrouck, the question to be asked is whether the money deposited in those accounts was “the product of, or substitute for, the original thing” (p. 335).  In the instant case, the identification process is quite simple.  I will not go back over the issue of the funds in BMP’s account: there was no relevant movement of funds. Regarding the funds in the related accounts when BNS acted on BMP’s instructions and transferred money to the accounts of 636651 B.C. Ltd., Backman (chequing and savings accounts) and Hashka, the transferred funds were clearly related to the forged cheque BNS had mistakenly credited to BMP’s account.  The moneys used for the transfers came from BMP’s account. The link is made with the funds RBC had used to pay the forged cheque.
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Il n’est pas contesté — et il est bien établi en droit — que la BRC (banque tirée) n’était pas autorisée à payer le chèque avec les fonds portés au crédit de First National (tireur apparent) et qu’elle aurait été tenue de rembourser sa cliente si elle avait effectué le paiement avec les fonds de celle‑ci.
[26] In the first enquiry, the question is whether the payor intends or is deemed in law to intend the payee to receive the funds. In the case at bar, the drawee provided the funds under the mistaken assumption that the drawer’s signatures were genuine.  It is not in dispute — and is well settled in law — that RBC, as the drawee, had no right to pay the cheque out of the funds it held to the credit of First National, the purported drawer, and that RBC would be liable to reimburse its customer if it used the customer’s funds to make the payment. Nor is the relationship between BNS and RBC in dispute. It is that of a collecting bank receiving funds from the drawee in order to remit them to the payee. The issue before the Court in this case is whether, as BMP argues, the loss must fall on the drawee bank.
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Elle possède les mêmes droits que la partie qui aurait versé une contrepartie. Il est donc possible d’affirmer que la BNÉ aurait pu, si elle l’avait voulu, refuser de transférer à la BRC l’argent qu’elle détenait en raison de l’effet frauduleux.
[41] According to this provision, BNS acquired the status of a holder in due course by receiving the cheque from the payee and crediting the amount to the payee’s account. Section 165(3) BEA deems the collecting bank to be in the same position as a party who has taken the bill free from any defect of title of prior parties.  It has the same right as a party who has given consideration.  Consequently, it can be argued that if BNS had chosen to do so, it could have refused to transfer to RBC the money it held on account of the fraudulent instrument.  However, the question is not whether it could rely on the protection of s. 165(3) BEA, but whether it could restore the funds to RBC.
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Toutes les conditions du recouvrement du paiement par erreur sont remplies. Comme la BNÉ pouvait à bon droit donner suite à la demande de la BRC visant la restitution des sommes payées par erreur de fait, l’argument du droit du tiers ne peut être retenu.
All the conditions for recovery of the payment made by mistake are met.  As BNS was entitled to give effect to RBC’s claim for restitution of the moneys paid under mistake of fact, the jus tertii argument fails.  The rightful owner had a legitimate claim against the recipient, and BNS had no duty to give preference to BMP.  BMP insisted on retaining the funds even though it had given no consideration for them and even though the fraud was beyond dispute.  BMP did not lose anything because the funds had to be returned to RBC.  BNS’s actions entailed no risk of curtailing the protection from which a holder in due course is entitled to benefit.  Finally, there are no policy considerations that would preclude BNS from responding to RBC’s common law right in this case.  [65-73]
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[71] Je ne puis concevoir aucune considération de politique générale qui, en l’espèce, empêcherait la BNÉ de donner suite au droit que la common law confère à la BRC. Comme je l’ai déjà mentionné, ni Price c.
[71] I can conceive of no policy consideration that would preclude BNS from responding to RBC’s common law right in this case. As I mentioned above, neither Price v. Neal nor Bank of Montreal v. The King stands for a strict rule that the drawee must in all circumstances bear a loss resulting from a cheque bearing a forged signature of the drawer.  There is no rule preventing RBC or BNS from arguing that the payment to BMP was made by mistake. The commentators find no convincing reason to establish an absolute rule against relief in the case of payment on the drawer’s forged signature (B. Geva, “Conversion of Unissued Cheques and the Fictitious or Non-Existing Payee — Boma v. CIBC” (1997), 28 Can. Bus. L.J. 177, at p. 189; Scott, “Comment on Reflections”, at p. 342).
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À l’exception des 100 $ ajoutés à la traite bancaire, l’identification de l’argent dans le compte de BMP ne pose pas de problème. Il n’est pas contesté qu’il provient des fonds reçus de la BRC. En tant que mandataire, la BNÉ a reçu les fonds de la BRC et, après qu’elle les a portés au crédit de son mandant, BMP, ces fonds lui ont été de nouveau remis en vertu du contrat bancaire.
Save for the $100 added to the bank draft, there is no issue of identification of the money in BMP’s account. The unchallenged evidence is that it comes from the funds received from RBC. BNS, as agent, received the funds from RBC and, after crediting them to its principal, BMP, received them back under the banking contract. Having received the funds back, BNS had to make restitution to RBC. Therefore, BNS has a valid defence against BMP (see Bavins, Junr. & Sims v. London and South Western Bank, Ltd., [1900] 1 Q.B. 270 (C.A.)). BNS’s status with respect to the funds in the related accounts is different. BNS was not acting as agent of the holders of the related accounts. A review of the rules on tracing will therefore be helpful.
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Le chèque était tiré sur le compte d’une société nommée First National Financial Corporation (« First National ») auprès d’une succursale de Toronto de la Banque Royale du Canada (« BRC »); il avait été reçu le jour même, sans lettre d’accompagnement, dans une enveloppe portant comme coordonnées de l’expéditeur E. Smith, 6‑6855 Airport Road, Mississauga (Ontario), L4V 1Y9, (416) 312‑7205.
[3] On October 22, 2001, Hashka went to a Burnaby branch of the Bank of Nova Scotia (“BNS”) where BMP held an account.  He said that he wanted to deposit an unendorsed cheque for C$904,563 that was payable to BMP. He informed the branch manager that the cheque was a down payment for distributorship rights for BMP’s products in the eastern United States (trial judgment, at para. 20).  The cheque was drawn on an account of a corporation called First National Financial Corporation (“First National”) at a Toronto branch of the Royal Bank of Canada (“RBC”). The cheque had been received the same day, without a cover letter, in an envelope on which the sender’s name and address appeared as E. Smith of 6‑6855 Airport Road, Mississauga, Ontario, L4V 1Y9, (416) 312‑7205.  Neither the drawer of the cheque nor the sender was known to Hashka or Backman or was apparently linked to Newman.  No attempts were made to contact either First National or E. Smith before the cheque was taken to the bank.
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Étant donné que seul un détenteur régulier peut se prévaloir de l’al. 128a) de la LLC, même si la BRC était réputée — à cause du paiement — avoir accepté le faux chèque, elle ne serait pas empêchée d’opposer à BMP l’authenticité des signatures du tireur.
[39] The most common view is that a payee is not, as a general rule, a holder in due course because he or she has not acquired the instrument by way of negotiation (s. 55(1)(b) BEA). Yet in some factual circumstances, dealings may take place before the payee becomes the holder of the instrument, and some commentators consider that the negotiation requirement needs to be revisited: Geva, “Reflections”, at pp. 289 ff.; see also St. Martin Supplies Inc. v. Boucley, [1969] C.S. 324.  This question need not be resolved for the purposes of the present case, however. It is another requirement for qualifying as a holder in due course under s. 55(1)(b) BEA that is lacking here: BMP did not take the instrument for value, so it was not a holder in due course.  Since only a holder in due course can benefit from s. 128(a) BEA, even if RBC were deemed — by payment — to have accepted the forged cheque, it would not be precluded from denying to BMP the genuineness of the drawer’s signatures.
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À l’exception des 100 $ ajoutés à la traite bancaire, l’identification de l’argent dans le compte de BMP ne pose pas de problème. Il n’est pas contesté qu’il provient des fonds reçus de la BRC. En tant que mandataire, la BNÉ a reçu les fonds de la BRC et, après qu’elle les a portés au crédit de son mandant, BMP, ces fonds lui ont été de nouveau remis en vertu du contrat bancaire.
Save for the $100 added to the bank draft, there is no issue of identification of the money in BMP’s account. The unchallenged evidence is that it comes from the funds received from RBC. BNS, as agent, received the funds from RBC and, after crediting them to its principal, BMP, received them back under the banking contract. Having received the funds back, BNS had to make restitution to RBC. Therefore, BNS has a valid defence against BMP (see Bavins, Junr. & Sims v. London and South Western Bank, Ltd., [1900] 1 Q.B. 270 (C.A.)). BNS’s status with respect to the funds in the related accounts is different. BNS was not acting as agent of the holders of the related accounts. A review of the rules on tracing will therefore be helpful.
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Il n’est pas contesté — et il est bien établi en droit — que la BRC (banque tirée) n’était pas autorisée à payer le chèque avec les fonds portés au crédit de First National (tireur apparent) et qu’elle aurait été tenue de rembourser sa cliente si elle avait effectué le paiement avec les fonds de celle‑ci.
[26] In the first enquiry, the question is whether the payor intends or is deemed in law to intend the payee to receive the funds. In the case at bar, the drawee provided the funds under the mistaken assumption that the drawer’s signatures were genuine.  It is not in dispute — and is well settled in law — that RBC, as the drawee, had no right to pay the cheque out of the funds it held to the credit of First National, the purported drawer, and that RBC would be liable to reimburse its customer if it used the customer’s funds to make the payment. Nor is the relationship between BNS and RBC in dispute. It is that of a collecting bank receiving funds from the drawee in order to remit them to the payee. The issue before the Court in this case is whether, as BMP argues, the loss must fall on the drawee bank.
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Le dépôt de l’effet falsifié ne pouvait donner naissance à une créance de BMP en l’espèce. Par conséquent, BMP n’a rien perdu du fait que les fonds devaient être retournés à la BRC. L’inscription au crédit procédant d’une erreur, le juge de première instance a conclu à tort que BMP avait été privée de son droit d’exiger de la BNÉ qu’elle paie sa dette.
[73] The trial judge was of the view that BMP and the holders of the related accounts had “suffered a loss of their right to demand repayment from the BNS of the BNS’ debt to them by reason of the BNS’ wrongful charge backs against their respective bank accounts” (para. 423).  In my view, BNS was entitled to object that since the cheque was forged, the funds could be and were returned to their rightful owner.  The deposit of the forged instrument could not result in a debt to BMP in this case.  Therefore, BMP did not lose anything because the funds had to be returned to RBC.  The trial judge’s conclusion that BMP had lost the right to demand payment of a debt owed by BNS is erroneous, because the credit entry in the account had been made by mistake.
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[24] Selon le premier volet du critère établi dans Simms, la BRC a, à première vue, droit au recouvrement. Nul ne conteste en l’espèce que l’effet payé était un faux. Selon le par. 48(1) de la LLC, la signature contrefaite est sans effet; elle ne confère pas le droit d’acquitter la lettre de change ou d’obliger une partie à en effectuer le paiement.
[24] On the first step of the Simms test, RBC has a prima facie right to recover.  It is common ground that payment was made on the basis of a forged instrument.  According to s. 48(1) BEA, a forged signature is wholly inoperative. It does not create a right to give a discharge for the bill or to enforce payment. RBC made the payment before discovering that the drawer’s signatures were forged. BMP no longer disputes the fact that the instrument is a forgery, but it contends that RBC must bear the loss and that BNS was not entitled to restrain the funds and transfer them to RBC.  This argument goes to the second step of the test. At the first step, there is no basis for denying that RBC has a prima facie right to recover the funds.
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[24] Selon le premier volet du critère établi dans Simms, la BRC a, à première vue, droit au recouvrement. Nul ne conteste en l’espèce que l’effet payé était un faux. Selon le par. 48(1) de la LLC, la signature contrefaite est sans effet; elle ne confère pas le droit d’acquitter la lettre de change ou d’obliger une partie à en effectuer le paiement.
[24] On the first step of the Simms test, RBC has a prima facie right to recover.  It is common ground that payment was made on the basis of a forged instrument.  According to s. 48(1) BEA, a forged signature is wholly inoperative. It does not create a right to give a discharge for the bill or to enforce payment. RBC made the payment before discovering that the drawer’s signatures were forged. BMP no longer disputes the fact that the instrument is a forgery, but it contends that RBC must bear the loss and that BNS was not entitled to restrain the funds and transfer them to RBC.  This argument goes to the second step of the test. At the first step, there is no basis for denying that RBC has a prima facie right to recover the funds.
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Elle possède les mêmes droits que la partie qui aurait versé une contrepartie. Il est donc possible d’affirmer que la BNÉ aurait pu, si elle l’avait voulu, refuser de transférer à la BRC l’argent qu’elle détenait en raison de l’effet frauduleux.
[41] According to this provision, BNS acquired the status of a holder in due course by receiving the cheque from the payee and crediting the amount to the payee’s account. Section 165(3) BEA deems the collecting bank to be in the same position as a party who has taken the bill free from any defect of title of prior parties.  It has the same right as a party who has given consideration.  Consequently, it can be argued that if BNS had chosen to do so, it could have refused to transfer to RBC the money it held on account of the fraudulent instrument.  However, the question is not whether it could rely on the protection of s. 165(3) BEA, but whether it could restore the funds to RBC.
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[24] Selon le premier volet du critère établi dans Simms, la BRC a, à première vue, droit au recouvrement. Nul ne conteste en l’espèce que l’effet payé était un faux. Selon le par. 48(1) de la LLC, la signature contrefaite est sans effet; elle ne confère pas le droit d’acquitter la lettre de change ou d’obliger une partie à en effectuer le paiement.
[24] On the first step of the Simms test, RBC has a prima facie right to recover.  It is common ground that payment was made on the basis of a forged instrument.  According to s. 48(1) BEA, a forged signature is wholly inoperative. It does not create a right to give a discharge for the bill or to enforce payment. RBC made the payment before discovering that the drawer’s signatures were forged. BMP no longer disputes the fact that the instrument is a forgery, but it contends that RBC must bear the loss and that BNS was not entitled to restrain the funds and transfer them to RBC.  This argument goes to the second step of the test. At the first step, there is no basis for denying that RBC has a prima facie right to recover the funds.
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Hashka et Backman que les fonds seraient retenus jusqu’à ce que la banque puisse s’assurer de l’authenticité de l’effet (jugement de première instance, par. 282). La BNÉ a vérifié auprès de la BRC que le compte de First National était suffisamment provisionné et que le chèque n’avait pas fait l’objet d’une opposition.
[4] On receiving the cheque, BNS recorded it as a deposit to BMP’s account. The cheque was not endorsed. BNS did not provide immediate access to the $904,563, because the funds already credited to the account were not sufficient to cover the amount of the cheque: the balance prior to the deposit was $59.67.  The circumstances were so unusual that the branch manager informed Hashka and Backman that the funds would be held until the bank was satisfied that the instrument was authentic (trial judgment, at para. 282).  BNS contacted RBC to ensure that there were sufficient funds in First National’s account and that a hold had not been placed on the cheque. BNS eventually received the funds in the ordinary course of business and released them on October 30, 2001. On that date and over the next ten days, BMP made numerous transactions, including a transfer of US$20,000 to a Citibank account in New York City whose holder Hashka and Backman said they did not know. The largest transfers were to accounts of Hashka and Backman and to an account opened on November 2, 2001 in the name of a holding company, 636651 B.C. Ltd., that was wholly controlled by Hashka. The Court of Appeal described this flurry of transactions as a dispersion of funds (2007 BCCA 52, 24 B.L.R. (4th) 201, at para. 11).
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La BRC, en tant que banque tirée, a fourni les fonds en croyant à tort à l’authenticité des signatures du tireur. Dans cette situation, on ne peut considérer que le payeur avait l’intention que le preneur conserve les fonds quoi qu’il arrive.
RBC, as drawee, provided the funds under the mistaken assumption that the drawer’s signature was genuine.  In this situation, the payor cannot be said to have intended the payee to keep the money in any event.  Nor is RBC deemed in law to intend that BMP keep the money.  First, the principle of finality of payment acts as a general goal, but it does not negate rights that may otherwise accrue to a party and it cannot be raised by a payee as an indiscriminate bar to the recovery of a mistaken payment.  Second, ss. 128(a) and 165(3) of the Bills of Exchange Act do not prevent RBC from recovering the money it paid by mistake.  BMP did not take the instrument for value, so it was not a holder in due course.  Since only a holder in due course can benefit from s. 128(a), even if RBC was deemed, by payment, to have accepted the forged cheque, it would not be precluded from denying to BMP the genuineness of the signatures of the drawer.  Section 165(3) deems the collecting bank to be in the same position as a party who has taken the bill free from any defect of title of prior parties.  A bank, however, is not obligated to rely on the s. 165(3) protection when restitution is claimed from it.  The payee, BMP, stands as a third party with respect to this protection.  The payee may benefit from defences that are inherent in the rules on mistake of fact, but not from the protection of s. 165(3).  Third, nothing in the service agreement between BMP and BNS precluded BNS from returning the funds to RBC.  Clause 4.7 of the agreement gives the bank an explicit right to charge back amounts credited to the customer’s account if an instrument is not settled.  The settlement referred to in this clause is the receipt of the funds through the banking system, and more particularly through the clearing mechanism available to members of the Canadian Payments Association.  Although the restraint of the funds by BNS could not be based on clause 4.7, since BNS had received settlement from RBC, the contract does not preclude the application of the common law where a payment has been made under a mistake of fact.  The service agreement is a standard form contract and the doctrine of mistake of fact can be seen as an implied term of the agreement. This is even more true here where a clause of the service agreement explicitly provides that BNS retains its rights under “any law” (clause 17.3).  Furthermore, the clearing rules of the Canadian Payments Association could not be relied on to
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L’identification de l’argent dans le compte de BMP ne pose pas de problème. La preuve incontestée indique clairement qu’il provient des fonds reçus de la BRC. En tant que mandataire, la BNÉ a reçu les fonds de la BRC et, après qu’elle les a portés au crédit de son mandant, BMP, ces fonds lui ont été de nouveau remis en vertu du contrat bancaire.
BNS had the right to claim the amount in BMP’s account and to trace funds in the related accounts.  There is no issue of identification of the money in BMP’s account.  The unchallenged evidence clearly indicates that it comes from the funds received from RBC.  BNS, as agent, received the funds from RBC and, after crediting them to its principal, BMP, received them back under the banking contract.  Having received the funds back, BNS had to make restitution to RBC.  BNS’s status with respect to the funds in the related accounts is different since BNS was not acting as agent of the holders of the related accounts.  It is possible at common law to trace funds into bank accounts if it is possible to identify the funds.  When the chain is broken by one of the intervening parties paying from its own funds, identification of the claimant’s funds is no longer possible.  However, the clearing system is a neutral factor and does not constitute a systematic break in the chain of possession of the funds.  Paying through the clearing system amounts to no more than channelling the funds.  Certification also does not affect the traceability of the underlying funds.  Here, the funds have not lost their identity.  When BNS acted on BMP’s instructions and transferred money to the related accounts, the transferred funds were clearly related to the forged cheque BNS had mistakenly credited to BMP’s account.  The fact that some of the related accounts had prior balances is not a bar to recovery.  Not only were the balances not substantial, but RBC can trace its own contribution to the balances remaining in the accounts since the withdrawals of all those who received funds far exceeded their contributions.  [77] [83‑88]
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L’identification de l’argent dans le compte de BMP ne pose pas de problème. La preuve incontestée indique clairement qu’il provient des fonds reçus de la BRC. En tant que mandataire, la BNÉ a reçu les fonds de la BRC et, après qu’elle les a portés au crédit de son mandant, BMP, ces fonds lui ont été de nouveau remis en vertu du contrat bancaire.
BNS had the right to claim the amount in BMP’s account and to trace funds in the related accounts.  There is no issue of identification of the money in BMP’s account.  The unchallenged evidence clearly indicates that it comes from the funds received from RBC.  BNS, as agent, received the funds from RBC and, after crediting them to its principal, BMP, received them back under the banking contract.  Having received the funds back, BNS had to make restitution to RBC.  BNS’s status with respect to the funds in the related accounts is different since BNS was not acting as agent of the holders of the related accounts.  It is possible at common law to trace funds into bank accounts if it is possible to identify the funds.  When the chain is broken by one of the intervening parties paying from its own funds, identification of the claimant’s funds is no longer possible.  However, the clearing system is a neutral factor and does not constitute a systematic break in the chain of possession of the funds.  Paying through the clearing system amounts to no more than channelling the funds.  Certification also does not affect the traceability of the underlying funds.  Here, the funds have not lost their identity.  When BNS acted on BMP’s instructions and transferred money to the related accounts, the transferred funds were clearly related to the forged cheque BNS had mistakenly credited to BMP’s account.  The fact that some of the related accounts had prior balances is not a bar to recovery.  Not only were the balances not substantial, but RBC can trace its own contribution to the balances remaining in the accounts since the withdrawals of all those who received funds far exceeded their contributions.  [77] [83‑88]
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Ils ont par la suite reçu un chèque non endossé de 904 563 $CAN, payable à l’ordre de BMP. Le chèque était tiré sur le compte d’une société à la Banque Royale du Canada (« BRC »). H et B ne connaissaient ni cette société ni le nom de l’expéditeur de l’enveloppe contenant le chèque, lesquels n’avaient ni l’un ni l’autre de lien apparent avec l’entreprise qui s’est portée acquéreur du droit de distribuer les articles de cuisson.
H and B owned interests in BMP, a company operating in British Columbia that distributed non‑stick bakeware.  They reached an agreement to sell the right to distribute the bakeware in the United States with a person they had recently met there. They subsequently received an unendorsed cheque of C$904,563 payable to BMP.  The cheque was drawn on the account of a company at the Royal Bank (“RBC”).  Neither this company nor the name of the sender of the envelope containing the cheque was known to H or B or was apparently linked to the business purchasing the right to distribute the bakeware.  H went to a branch of the Bank of Nova Scotia (“BNS”) where BMP held an account to deposit the cheque.  BNS did not provide BMP with immediate access to the funds, but eventually received the funds from RBC in the ordinary course of business and released them to BMP.  On that day and over the next 10 days, BMP made numerous transfers to other BNS accounts related to H, B, and H’s holding company.  RBC subsequently notified BNS that the cheque for $904,563 was counterfeit, as the drawer’s signatures were forged and asked for BNS’s assistance.  BNS interrupted all transactions in BMP’s account and in all related accounts and asked BMP for assistance in recovering the proceeds of the forged cheque.  BMP insisted on retaining the amount it still held.  BNS then restrained the funds in accounts under its control that it linked to the forged cheque.  RBC and BNS entered into an agreement by which BNS was, at RBC’s request, to transfer the restrained funds to RBC and RBC was to indemnify BNS for any losses related to the restraint and transfer.  BNS transferred $777,336 to RBC.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
De même, les fonds visés en l’espèce n’ont pas perdu la leur. La BNÉ, en tant que banque d’encaissement, a reçu les fonds de la BRC par l’entremise du système de compensation et les a portés au crédit de BMP.
[84] In Hambrouck, the funds received through the clearing system by Farrow’s Bank, acting as the collecting bank, from the Banque Belge pour l’Étranger had not lost their “identity”. In the same way, the funds in the case at bar have not lost theirs.  BNS, acting as the collecting bank, received the funds from RBC through the clearing system and credited them to BMP. The asset traced by RBC is simply its own. It is not the chose in action or the account holders’s personal claim against BNS: R. M. Goode, “The Right to Trace and its Impact in Commercial Transactions — I” (1976), 92 L.Q. Rev. 360, at p. 380. The transactions that followed were all conducted by the recipient and persons related to it who received the money from BMP. Moreover, the fact that some of the accounts had prior balances is not a bar to recovery.  Not only were the balances not substantial  —  only one of the accounts contained over $100 —  but the withdrawals by the holders significantly exceeded the balances. It is also worth noting that BNS was both the drawee and the payees’ banker in all the transactions at issue, namely the transfers and payments from BMP’s account and to the related accounts. There was no hiatus like the one in Agip, and the holders of the related accounts were not third parties who had given consideration or changed their positions.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
L’identification de l’argent dans le compte de BMP ne pose pas de problème. La preuve incontestée indique clairement qu’il provient des fonds reçus de la BRC. En tant que mandataire, la BNÉ a reçu les fonds de la BRC et, après qu’elle les a portés au crédit de son mandant, BMP, ces fonds lui ont été de nouveau remis en vertu du contrat bancaire.
BNS had the right to claim the amount in BMP’s account and to trace funds in the related accounts.  There is no issue of identification of the money in BMP’s account.  The unchallenged evidence clearly indicates that it comes from the funds received from RBC.  BNS, as agent, received the funds from RBC and, after crediting them to its principal, BMP, received them back under the banking contract.  Having received the funds back, BNS had to make restitution to RBC.  BNS’s status with respect to the funds in the related accounts is different since BNS was not acting as agent of the holders of the related accounts.  It is possible at common law to trace funds into bank accounts if it is possible to identify the funds.  When the chain is broken by one of the intervening parties paying from its own funds, identification of the claimant’s funds is no longer possible.  However, the clearing system is a neutral factor and does not constitute a systematic break in the chain of possession of the funds.  Paying through the clearing system amounts to no more than channelling the funds.  Certification also does not affect the traceability of the underlying funds.  Here, the funds have not lost their identity.  When BNS acted on BMP’s instructions and transferred money to the related accounts, the transferred funds were clearly related to the forged cheque BNS had mistakenly credited to BMP’s account.  The fact that some of the related accounts had prior balances is not a bar to recovery.  Not only were the balances not substantial, but RBC can trace its own contribution to the balances remaining in the accounts since the withdrawals of all those who received funds far exceeded their contributions.  [77] [83‑88]
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
La BRC, en tant que banque tirée, a fourni les fonds en croyant à tort à l’authenticité des signatures du tireur. Dans cette situation, on ne peut considérer que le payeur avait l’intention que le preneur conserve les fonds quoi qu’il arrive.
RBC, as drawee, provided the funds under the mistaken assumption that the drawer’s signature was genuine.  In this situation, the payor cannot be said to have intended the payee to keep the money in any event.  Nor is RBC deemed in law to intend that BMP keep the money.  First, the principle of finality of payment acts as a general goal, but it does not negate rights that may otherwise accrue to a party and it cannot be raised by a payee as an indiscriminate bar to the recovery of a mistaken payment.  Second, ss. 128(a) and 165(3) of the Bills of Exchange Act do not prevent RBC from recovering the money it paid by mistake.  BMP did not take the instrument for value, so it was not a holder in due course.  Since only a holder in due course can benefit from s. 128(a), even if RBC was deemed, by payment, to have accepted the forged cheque, it would not be precluded from denying to BMP the genuineness of the signatures of the drawer.  Section 165(3) deems the collecting bank to be in the same position as a party who has taken the bill free from any defect of title of prior parties.  A bank, however, is not obligated to rely on the s. 165(3) protection when restitution is claimed from it.  The payee, BMP, stands as a third party with respect to this protection.  The payee may benefit from defences that are inherent in the rules on mistake of fact, but not from the protection of s. 165(3).  Third, nothing in the service agreement between BMP and BNS precluded BNS from returning the funds to RBC.  Clause 4.7 of the agreement gives the bank an explicit right to charge back amounts credited to the customer’s account if an instrument is not settled.  The settlement referred to in this clause is the receipt of the funds through the banking system, and more particularly through the clearing mechanism available to members of the Canadian Payments Association.  Although the restraint of the funds by BNS could not be based on clause 4.7, since BNS had received settlement from RBC, the contract does not preclude the application of the common law where a payment has been made under a mistake of fact.  The service agreement is a standard form contract and the doctrine of mistake of fact can be seen as an implied term of the agreement. This is even more true here where a clause of the service agreement explicitly provides that BNS retains its rights under “any law” (clause 17.3).  Furthermore, the clearing rules of the Canadian Payments Association could not be relied on to
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
La BRC, en tant que banque tirée, a fourni les fonds en croyant à tort à l’authenticité des signatures du tireur. Dans cette situation, on ne peut considérer que le payeur avait l’intention que le preneur conserve les fonds quoi qu’il arrive.
RBC, as drawee, provided the funds under the mistaken assumption that the drawer’s signature was genuine.  In this situation, the payor cannot be said to have intended the payee to keep the money in any event.  Nor is RBC deemed in law to intend that BMP keep the money.  First, the principle of finality of payment acts as a general goal, but it does not negate rights that may otherwise accrue to a party and it cannot be raised by a payee as an indiscriminate bar to the recovery of a mistaken payment.  Second, ss. 128(a) and 165(3) of the Bills of Exchange Act do not prevent RBC from recovering the money it paid by mistake.  BMP did not take the instrument for value, so it was not a holder in due course.  Since only a holder in due course can benefit from s. 128(a), even if RBC was deemed, by payment, to have accepted the forged cheque, it would not be precluded from denying to BMP the genuineness of the signatures of the drawer.  Section 165(3) deems the collecting bank to be in the same position as a party who has taken the bill free from any defect of title of prior parties.  A bank, however, is not obligated to rely on the s. 165(3) protection when restitution is claimed from it.  The payee, BMP, stands as a third party with respect to this protection.  The payee may benefit from defences that are inherent in the rules on mistake of fact, but not from the protection of s. 165(3).  Third, nothing in the service agreement between BMP and BNS precluded BNS from returning the funds to RBC.  Clause 4.7 of the agreement gives the bank an explicit right to charge back amounts credited to the customer’s account if an instrument is not settled.  The settlement referred to in this clause is the receipt of the funds through the banking system, and more particularly through the clearing mechanism available to members of the Canadian Payments Association.  Although the restraint of the funds by BNS could not be based on clause 4.7, since BNS had received settlement from RBC, the contract does not preclude the application of the common law where a payment has been made under a mistake of fact.  The service agreement is a standard form contract and the doctrine of mistake of fact can be seen as an implied term of the agreement. This is even more true here where a clause of the service agreement explicitly provides that BNS retains its rights under “any law” (clause 17.3).  Furthermore, the clearing rules of the Canadian Payments Association could not be relied on to
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Ils ont par la suite reçu un chèque non endossé de 904 563 $CAN, payable à l’ordre de BMP. Le chèque était tiré sur le compte d’une société à la Banque Royale du Canada (« BRC »). H et B ne connaissaient ni cette société ni le nom de l’expéditeur de l’enveloppe contenant le chèque, lesquels n’avaient ni l’un ni l’autre de lien apparent avec l’entreprise qui s’est portée acquéreur du droit de distribuer les articles de cuisson.
H and B owned interests in BMP, a company operating in British Columbia that distributed non‑stick bakeware.  They reached an agreement to sell the right to distribute the bakeware in the United States with a person they had recently met there. They subsequently received an unendorsed cheque of C$904,563 payable to BMP.  The cheque was drawn on the account of a company at the Royal Bank (“RBC”).  Neither this company nor the name of the sender of the envelope containing the cheque was known to H or B or was apparently linked to the business purchasing the right to distribute the bakeware.  H went to a branch of the Bank of Nova Scotia (“BNS”) where BMP held an account to deposit the cheque.  BNS did not provide BMP with immediate access to the funds, but eventually received the funds from RBC in the ordinary course of business and released them to BMP.  On that day and over the next 10 days, BMP made numerous transfers to other BNS accounts related to H, B, and H’s holding company.  RBC subsequently notified BNS that the cheque for $904,563 was counterfeit, as the drawer’s signatures were forged and asked for BNS’s assistance.  BNS interrupted all transactions in BMP’s account and in all related accounts and asked BMP for assistance in recovering the proceeds of the forged cheque.  BMP insisted on retaining the amount it still held.  BNS then restrained the funds in accounts under its control that it linked to the forged cheque.  RBC and BNS entered into an agreement by which BNS was, at RBC’s request, to transfer the restrained funds to RBC and RBC was to indemnify BNS for any losses related to the restraint and transfer.  BNS transferred $777,336 to RBC.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
D’après son raisonnement, une fois que [traduction] « la BNÉ et la BRC sont parvenues au règlement définitif concernant le dépôt du faux chèque », les fonds du compte de BMP [traduction] « sont passés de crédit “provisoire” à crédit “définitif”.  La relation entre la BNÉ et les demandeurs devenait alors une relation débiteur‑créancier » (par. 306).
[10] Cohen J. found that since BMP was not suing to enforce payment of the cheque, whether or not the cheque was a nullity or whether or not accepting BMP’s position would allow a windfall to accrue to BMP had no bearing on the outcome of the litigation (paras. 284-85).  In his view, BNS had violated the service agreement as well as the law applicable to banker/customer relations by charging back amounts credited to the accounts of BMP and the other plaintiffs. Cohen J. interpreted the service agreement as incorporating the clearing rules of the Canadian Payments Association (“clearing rules”) and precluding BNS from charging back against its customer’s account. He reasoned that once “final settlement on the deposit of the Counterfeit Cheque had been reached between the BNS and the RBC”, the funds in BMP’s account “went from being a ‘provisional’ credit to being a ‘final’ credit.  At that stage the relationship between the BNS and the plaintiffs was that of debtor/creditor” (para. 306). Regarding the related accounts, Cohen J. found that the law prevented a bank charging back against a customer’s account without the customer’s permission. He awarded the plaintiffs pecuniary damages because they had “suffered a loss of their right to demand repayment from the BNS of the BNS’ debt to them by reason of the BNS’ wrongful charge backs against their respective bank accounts” (para. 423). He assessed the total pecuniary damages at $777,336.04, the sum of all the charge backs and the reversed payments.  He also awarded Backman $13.50 for a late charge due to BNS’s failure to honour certain payment instructions while his account was restrained.  Cohen J. also awarded damages for wrongful disclosure of information and defamation.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Ils ont par la suite reçu un chèque non endossé de 904 563 $CAN, payable à l’ordre de BMP. Le chèque était tiré sur le compte d’une société à la Banque Royale du Canada (« BRC »). H et B ne connaissaient ni cette société ni le nom de l’expéditeur de l’enveloppe contenant le chèque, lesquels n’avaient ni l’un ni l’autre de lien apparent avec l’entreprise qui s’est portée acquéreur du droit de distribuer les articles de cuisson.
H and B owned interests in BMP, a company operating in British Columbia that distributed non‑stick bakeware.  They reached an agreement to sell the right to distribute the bakeware in the United States with a person they had recently met there. They subsequently received an unendorsed cheque of C$904,563 payable to BMP.  The cheque was drawn on the account of a company at the Royal Bank (“RBC”).  Neither this company nor the name of the sender of the envelope containing the cheque was known to H or B or was apparently linked to the business purchasing the right to distribute the bakeware.  H went to a branch of the Bank of Nova Scotia (“BNS”) where BMP held an account to deposit the cheque.  BNS did not provide BMP with immediate access to the funds, but eventually received the funds from RBC in the ordinary course of business and released them to BMP.  On that day and over the next 10 days, BMP made numerous transfers to other BNS accounts related to H, B, and H’s holding company.  RBC subsequently notified BNS that the cheque for $904,563 was counterfeit, as the drawer’s signatures were forged and asked for BNS’s assistance.  BNS interrupted all transactions in BMP’s account and in all related accounts and asked BMP for assistance in recovering the proceeds of the forged cheque.  BMP insisted on retaining the amount it still held.  BNS then restrained the funds in accounts under its control that it linked to the forged cheque.  RBC and BNS entered into an agreement by which BNS was, at RBC’s request, to transfer the restrained funds to RBC and RBC was to indemnify BNS for any losses related to the restraint and transfer.  BNS transferred $777,336 to RBC.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
La BRC, en tant que banque tirée, a fourni les fonds en croyant à tort à l’authenticité des signatures du tireur. Dans cette situation, on ne peut considérer que le payeur avait l’intention que le preneur conserve les fonds quoi qu’il arrive.
RBC, as drawee, provided the funds under the mistaken assumption that the drawer’s signature was genuine.  In this situation, the payor cannot be said to have intended the payee to keep the money in any event.  Nor is RBC deemed in law to intend that BMP keep the money.  First, the principle of finality of payment acts as a general goal, but it does not negate rights that may otherwise accrue to a party and it cannot be raised by a payee as an indiscriminate bar to the recovery of a mistaken payment.  Second, ss. 128(a) and 165(3) of the Bills of Exchange Act do not prevent RBC from recovering the money it paid by mistake.  BMP did not take the instrument for value, so it was not a holder in due course.  Since only a holder in due course can benefit from s. 128(a), even if RBC was deemed, by payment, to have accepted the forged cheque, it would not be precluded from denying to BMP the genuineness of the signatures of the drawer.  Section 165(3) deems the collecting bank to be in the same position as a party who has taken the bill free from any defect of title of prior parties.  A bank, however, is not obligated to rely on the s. 165(3) protection when restitution is claimed from it.  The payee, BMP, stands as a third party with respect to this protection.  The payee may benefit from defences that are inherent in the rules on mistake of fact, but not from the protection of s. 165(3).  Third, nothing in the service agreement between BMP and BNS precluded BNS from returning the funds to RBC.  Clause 4.7 of the agreement gives the bank an explicit right to charge back amounts credited to the customer’s account if an instrument is not settled.  The settlement referred to in this clause is the receipt of the funds through the banking system, and more particularly through the clearing mechanism available to members of the Canadian Payments Association.  Although the restraint of the funds by BNS could not be based on clause 4.7, since BNS had received settlement from RBC, the contract does not preclude the application of the common law where a payment has been made under a mistake of fact.  The service agreement is a standard form contract and the doctrine of mistake of fact can be seen as an implied term of the agreement. This is even more true here where a clause of the service agreement explicitly provides that BNS retains its rights under “any law” (clause 17.3).  Furthermore, the clearing rules of the Canadian Payments Association could not be relied on to
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