|
Inviter une personne qui doit être accusée à faire valoir son point de vue auprès du Procureur général avant qu’un juge de paix soit saisi d’une dénonciation équivaudrait dans bien des cas, et à coup sûr dans la plupart des plus importants, à inviter cette personne à se soustraire à la justice. Les commentaires suivants du Juge Kerwin, alors juge puîné, dans Dallman c. Le Roi[6], au bas de la page 344, sont pertinents ici:
|
|
In these views, I find it unnecessary to say more with respect to the appellant’s two alternative submissions, than that I am unable to find any substance in either. Suffice it to say that prima facie evidence tendered in an ex parte application before a justice of the peace is sufficient to permit him to compel, either by summons or warrant, the appearance before the court of the person charged and that prima facie evidence may also permit a justice of the peace to commit the person charged for trial at the end of the preliminary inquiry. To invite a person to be charged to make representations to the Attorney General before an information is laid before a justice of the peace would, in many cases and surely in most of the important ones, be tantamount to an invitation to that person to abscond. The following comments made by Kerwin J., as he then was, in Dallman v. The King[6], at the bottom of page 344, is here relevant:
|