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  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Parisien (1981), 18 C.C.L.T. 79 (H.C. Ont.), des dommages‑intérêts punitifs ont été accordés pour la rupture d'un bail après qu'on ait jugé que les demandeurs avaient agi [TRADUCTION] "de manière tyrannique et scandaleusement méprisante" et qu'ils s'étaient servis de leur pouvoir supérieur pour [TRADUCTION] "forcer" la demanderesse à acquiescer et à renoncer à ses droits au bail.
However, in Dale Perusse Ltd. v. Kason (1985), 6 C.P.C. (2d) 129 (Ont. H.C.), Noranda Mines Ltd. v. Seaboard Surety Co. (1985), 7 C.C.E.L. 227 (Ont. Div. Ct.), Centennial Centre of Science and Technology v. VS Services Ltd. (1982), 40 O.R. (2d) 253 (H.C.), and Delmotte v. John Labatt Ltd. (1978), 22 O.R. (2d) 90 (H.C.), the courts refused to strike such a claim from the pleadings.  Moreover, in Nantel v. Parisien (1981), 18 C.C.L.T. 79 (Ont. H.C.), punitive damages were awarded for breach of a lease when the defendants were found to have acted in a "high-handed and shockingly contemptuous manner" and used their superior power to "steam-roll" the plaintiff to acquiesce and surrender her legal rights to the lease.  In that case the defendants broke the lease by breaking into the plaintiff's premises, removing her belongings and then demolishing the building even when the plaintiff attempted to occupy the premises as she was legally entitled to do.  Galligan J. noted that the defendants were anxious to break their lease with the plaintiff and demolish the premises in order to make way for a shopping centre development and stated at p. 87 that purely compensatory damages for breach of contract would be inadequate in these circumstances:
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Le principe général qui justifie la protection de ces communications est respecté. Les intérêts de la cliente maintenant décédée sont servis, en ce sens que l'admission du témoignage a précisément pour but d'établir ses intentions véritables.
In my view, the considerations which support the admissibility of communications between solicitor and client in the wills context apply with equal force to the present case.  The general policy which supports privileging such communications is not violated.  The interests of the now deceased client are furthered in the sense that the purpose of allowing the evidence to be admitted is precisely to ascertain what her true intentions were.  And the principle of extending the privilege to the heirs or successors in title of the deceased is promoted by focusing the inquiry on who those heirs or successors properly are.  In summary, it is, in the words of Anderson Surr. Ct. J. in Re Ott, supra, "[i]n the interests of justice" to admit such evidence.
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Á œ œ ÁVersion franÀ' Àaise du jugement de la Cour rendu oralement par Á œ œ Áà ÃLe Juge en ChefÄ Ä--Dans les circonstances de cette affaire, nous sommes tous d'avis que les intÀ) ÀrÀ+ Àts de la justice seront mieux servis si un nouveau procÀ/ Às est ordonnÀ) À.
\+\+\+Ü Ü ÔŒ™Á œ œ Áà ÃPeter Martin, Q.C.Ä Ä, for the respondent. Á œ œ ÁThe judgment of the Court was delivered orally by Á œ œ Áà ÃThe Chief JusticeÄ Ä--Under the particular circumstances of this case, we are all of the view that the interests of justice will best be served by the ordering of a new trial. Á œ œ ÁWe accordingly allow the appeal, quash the conviction and order a new trial. Á œ œ Áà ÃJudgment accordingly. Á œ œ ÁSolicitor for the appellant:  Alexander D. Pringle, Edmonton. Á œ œ ÁSolicitor for the respondent:  Peter W. L. Martin, Calgary.Ä Ä
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Évidemment, la partie qui choisit de demander une autorisation de pourvoi contre une conclusion à la constitutionnalité sera celle dont les intérêts ne sont pas servis par la conclusion tirée en la matière par la cour d'appel.
14               Accordingly, where the highest court of final resort of a province has made a ruling on the constitutionality of a Criminal Code provision, either party may seek leave to appeal that ruling to this Court, regardless of whether a finding of culpability accompanied the ruling and, if there was an accompanying finding of culpability, regardless of whether that finding is appealable as of right or on granting of leave.  Of course, the party choosing to seek leave to appeal a ruling of constitutionality will be the party whose interests are not served by the ruling on constitutionality below.  Nonetheless, this dual proceedings approach insures that leave can always be sought to appeal rulings on constitutionality whether or not the party seeking leave "won" or "lost" in the ruling on culpability in the court below.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Le ministère public qualifie cette omission de "bêtise" ou de "bourde", mais ce qui s'est produit en réalité, c'est que les policiers ont délibérément induit l'appelant en erreur et se sont servis de cette supercherie pour procéder à une fouille rectale extrêmement envahissante.
In balancing the long-term consequences of regularly admitting the evidence in this case in the light of how it was obtained against the consequences of excluding it, I conclude that the balance tips in favour of exclusion.  The administration of our system of justice will be brought into greater disrepute if this Court were to condone, taking the record as it is given to us by the police and the prosecution, the practice of using an arrest for traffic warrants as an artifice to conduct a rectal exam of an accused who the police do not have reasonable and probable grounds to believe is carrying drugs.  In fact, even if reasonable and probable grounds existed, support for which was not established by the Crown, there is still the admission by the Crown that the police deliberately failed to provide the appellant with the proper reason for the arrest, thereby infringing his rights under s. 10(a) of the Charter.  The Crown refers to this as "foolish" and a "blunder", but in fact, it amounts to the police deliberately misleading the appellant and using that deception as an artifice to conduct a highly invasive rectal search.  Whatever the motives for this deception, it can only lead to an inference of extreme bad faith on the part of the police in that they wilfully circumvented the Charter, a factor which further supports the exclusion of the evidence in this case.  This is especially so when what is involved is a violation of the right to counsel as well as a violation of the right to be secure against unreasonable searches.  It would be easy, but at the same time very dangerous, to allow the knowledge that the appellant must have had in respect of his possession of the drugs, to influence this Court's assessment of whether the evidence should be excluded.  To do so would be to import an ex post facto chain of reasoning that finds no place in an inquiry pursuant to s. 24(2) of the Charter.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
24 Le Code of Professional Conduct de la Law Society of Alberta prévoit que [traduction] « [d]ans chaque affaire, le jugement d’un avocat et sa fidélité aux intérêts de son client doivent être à l’abri de toute influence compromettante » (ch. 6, Statement of Principle, p. 50). Les faits en l’espèce illustrent plusieurs objectifs importants servis par ce principe.
24 The Law Society of Alberta’s Code of Professional Conduct provides that “[i]n each matter, a lawyer’s judgment and fidelity to the client’s interests must be free from compromising influences” (c. 6, Statement of Principle, p. 50).  The facts of this case illustrate a number of important objectives served by this principle.  Loyalty required the Venkatraman law firm to focus on the interest of the appellant without being distracted by other interests including personal interests.  Part of the problem here seems to have been Lazin’s determination to hang onto a piece of litigation.  When Lazin was asked about “the ethical issue” in acting for Lambert, he said maybe “it was a question of not wanting to give up the file”.  Loyalty includes putting the client’s business ahead of the lawyer’s business.  The appellant was entitled to a level of commitment from his lawyer that whatever could properly be done on his behalf would be done as surely as it would have been done if the appellant had had the skills and training to do the job personally.  On learning that his own lawyer had put before the divorce court evidence of his further wrongdoing, the appellant understandably felt betrayed.  Equally, the public in Edmonton, where the prosecution of the appellant had attracted considerable notoriety, required assurance that the truth had been ascertained by an adversarial system that functioned clearly and without hidden agendas.
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  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
C’est en réponse à cette lettre de la ville et à la lumière des termes fort provocants et préjudiciables dont les appelants se sont servis pour critiquer la procédure adoptée par les intimés que Kohler écrivit en son nom et en celui de son associé, l’intimé Craig, la lettre contenant le libelle allégué.
It was in reply to this letter from the city and in light of the highly provocative and damaging language used by the appellants in criticism of the procedure for which the respondents were responsible that Kohler wrote the letter on behalf of himself and his partner, the respondent Craig, which contained the alleged libel. The letter is reproduced in full in the reasons for judgment of Schroeder J.A., in 14 D.L.R. (3d) at p. 398, and the following language contained in that letter constitutes the alleged libel complained of in the statement of claim.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
En dernière analyse, on peut soutenir que les valeurs et les principes qui animent une société libre et démocratique sont mieux servis par une définition qui place la représentation effective au coeur même du droit de vote.
In the final analysis, the values and principles animating a free and democratic society are arguably best served by a definition that places effective representation at the heart of the right to vote.  The concerns which Dickson C.J. in Oakes associated with a free and democratic society -- respect for the inherent dignity of the human person, commitment to social justice and equality, respect for cultural and group identity, and faith in social and political institutions which enhance the participation of individuals in society -- are better met by an electoral system that focuses on effective representation than by one that focuses on mathematical parity.  Respect for individual dignity and social equality mandate that citizen's votes not be unduly debased or diluted.  But the need to recognize cultural and group identity and to enhance the participation of individuals in the electoral process and society requires that other concerns also be accommodated.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
. si [l’atteinte] est raisonnable, compte tenu des intérêts d’ordre public servis par, d’un côté, la répression efficace des agissements criminels, et de l’autre, le respect de la liberté et de la dignité fondamentale des individus.
. . . whether such an invasion is reasonable in light of the public purposes served by effective control of criminal acts on the one hand and on the other respect for the liberty and fundamental dignity of individuals. [pp. 181-82]
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
[traduction] Une telle rigidité compromet l’intégrité de l’institution même du jury, puisqu’elle oblige le tribunal à dire aux jurés que, en dépit du fait qu’ils aient dûment respecté leur serment et écouté des jours et des jours de témoignages et de plaidoiries, puis rendu un verdict unanime et par ailleurs valide, leur décision doit être écartée. [. . .]  [L]es intérêts de l’État et du public en général ne seraient pas servis .
Such rigidity jeopardizes the integrity of the jury system since it forces the court to tell the jurors that despite the fact that they have dutifully carried out the oath that they had sworn to uphold by listening to days of evidence and then rendering a unanimous and otherwise valid verdict, their decision must be ignored. . . . [T]he interests of the state and the general public would not be served . . . .
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Compte tenu de toutes les circonstances de l'affaire, je crois que les intérêts de la justice seront le mieux servis en accueillant ce pourvoi, en annulant l'ordonnance de la Cour d'appel et en ne touchant pas au verdict d'acquittement qui a été inscrit.
42.              A considerable amount of time has elapsed since that jury was discharged. When considering all of the circumstances of the case, I think that the ends of justice will best be served by allowing this appeal, quashing the order of the Court of Appeal and leaving the acquittal, as registered, undisturbed.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Ni le système du jury ni l’intégrité de la justice criminelle ne sont bien servis par la perpétration de fictions. Le débat actuel dans les tribunaux et les journaux spécialisés sur la question de savoir si l’erreur doit être fondée, est important sur le plan
Perpetuation of fictions does little for the jury system or the integrity of criminal justice. The ongoing debate in the courts and learned journals as to whether mistake must be reasonable is conceptually important in the orderly development of
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
21 La mise à l’écart complète du privilège aurait pour effet indésirable et peu rassurant que les personnes ayant besoin de suivre un traitement pour des maladies graves et dangereuses seraient moins portées à consulter un professionnel. Dans ce cas, les intérêts de l’appelant, et plus important encore, les intérêts de la société seraient mieux servis si l’appelant pouvait être traité.
21 The chilling effect of completely breaching the privilege would have the undesired effect of discouraging those individuals in need of treatment for serious and dangerous conditions from consulting professional help.  In this case the interests of the appellant and more importantly the interests of society would be better served by his obtaining treatment.  This Court has recognized that mental health, including those suffering from potentially dangerous illnesses, is an important public good:  see M. (A.) v. Ryan, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 157, at para. 27.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
7 que l'article en cause en l'espèce. Le législateur a donc conclu que les besoins de la société peuvent être servis par une disposition moins draconienne. Comme l'intimée a modifié sa législation en ce sens, je ne pense pas qu'elle puisse maintenant soutenir que la version contestée du par.
There can be no doubt that this provision infringes the accused's s. 7 rights less than the section challenged in the present appeal. Parliament has therefore concluded that society's needs can be served by a less stringent provision. Given that the respondent has changed its legislation in this way, I do not think it is open to the respondent to argue that the impugned version of s. 146(1) impaired the accused's rights as little as possible. This is not a case where the court is forced to speculate about the possibility of less offensive legislative schemes. Parliament has already enacted one.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Étant donné le délai écoulé depuis la libération du jury, les intérêts de la justice seraient mieux servis en accueillant le pourvoi, en annulant l'ordonnance portant nouveau procès et en ne touchant pas au verdict d'acquittement qui a été inscrit.
Per Lamer J.: A jury, even after discharge, can be reconvened to correct an improper or incomplete transmission or registration of a verdict, but it cannot reconsider a verdict or complete its deliberations with a view to handing down additional verdicts on counts or on included offences that it had not finally determined prior to that discharge; nor can anyone go behind the verdict and make inquiries as regards the nature of the deliberations. The effect of adopting the rule, until now applicable to civil matters, is to ensure that those found guilty by the jury do not go free and, more importantly, that those found innocent by the jury are not convicted.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
L'intimé a clairement affirmé son droit de garder le silence et sa volonté de consulter son avocat. Il y avait, à portée de la main dans le bureau, un téléphone dont se sont servis les agents pour leurs propres fins.
22.              In my view, this aspect of the right to counsel was clearly infringed in this case. The respondent clearly asserted his right to remain silent and his desire to consult his lawyer. There was a telephone immediately at hand in the office, which the officers used for their own purposes. It was not necessary for the respondent to make an express request to use the telephone. The duty to facilitate contact with counsel included the duty to offer the respondent the use of the telephone. Of course, there may be circumstances in which it is particularly urgent that the police continue with an investigation before it is possible to facilitate a detainee's communication with counsel. There was no urgency in the circumstances surrounding the offences in this case.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Il semble clair que le bien‑être d’un tel enfant ne peut être facilement dissocié des intérêts de la famille. En résumé, ni l’intérêt de l’enfant qui a subi un préjudice, ni celui des autres membres de la famille ne sont servis par la reconnaissance judiciaire de la cause d’action proposée.
47 Such litigation would, in all probability, have detrimental consequences, not only for the relationship between mother and child, but also for the relationship between the child and his or her family.  Yet, family harmony will be particularly important for the creation of a caring and nurturing environment for the injured child, who will undoubtedly require much loving attention.  It seems clear that the well‑being of such a child cannot be readily severed from the interests of his or her family.  In short, neither the best interests of the injured child, nor those of the remainder of the family, would be served by the judicial recognition of the suggested cause of action.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Dans son deuxième rapport de suivi en 2004, la Commissaire indique qu’un seul client francophone traitait avec Simcoe Nord en français. Cinq autres clients francophones ont choisi d’être servis en anglais.
[60] The crux of the problem is that, despite these efforts, North Simcoe still seems incapable of reaching the French‑speaking minority community and actually involving that community in its program.  Training sessions and workshops in French are usually cancelled due to lack of participation.  In her second follow‑up report in 2004, the Commissioner stated that only one French‑speaking client was dealing with North Simcoe in French.  Five other French‑speaking clients had chosen to be served in English.  North Simcoe has never received a loan application in French, despite the creation of a French‑language investment committee.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Toutefois, les appelants ont demandé que cette question soit tranchée sans renvoi à la Convention ou à la Loi, puisqu'il existe entre les parties d'autres procédures judiciaires relativement à l'interprétation et à l'application du document en question. C'est pourquoi les appelants ne se sont pas servis de ce document pour faire valoir qu'il y aurait eu violation de leurs droits ancestraux.
The evaluation of these competing arguments requires an examination and interpretation of the Agreement as embodied in the James Bay Act.  The appellants, however, requested that this question be determined without reference to the Agreement or to the Act, since its interpretation and application form the subject of other legal proceedings involving the parties to this appeal.  The appellants accordingly placed no reliance on this document in their assertion of a breach of aboriginal rights.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Toutefois, le couteau lui‑même est un élément de preuve matérielle qui existait peu importe que les policiers aient violé ou non les droits garantis à l'appelante par l'al. 10b) et se soient servis d'elle pour préparer la preuve contre elle.
However, the knife itself is real evidence which existed whether or not the police breached the appellant's s. 10(b) rights and used her to assist in the preparation of the case against her.  It did not come into existence as a result of the participation of the accused although the police obtained it as a result of such participation.  I have little doubt that the police would have conducted a search of the appellant's apartment with or without her assistance and that such a search would have uncovered the knife.  In Collins Lamer J. concluded that the admission of real evidence will not usually, just because it was obtained as a result of a Charter breach, bring the administration of justice into disrepute.  He stated at p. 284:
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
‑ Le principe selon lequel les intérêts de la justice sont mieux servis par la tenue du procès dans le ressort où le crime aurait été commis et où les effets préjudiciables se seraient fait sentir (Mellino, précité, p. 555 et 558; Idziak, précité, p. 662; et voir Cotroni, précité,  p. 1488).
- that individuals accused of a crime should be brought to trial to determine the truth of the charges (see Cotroni, supra, at pp. 1487 and 1495), the concern in this case being that if assurances are sought and refused, the Canadian government could face the possibility that the respondents might avoid a trial altogether;
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
L'intimée a demandé que les dépens soient taxés comme entre procureur et client, ce qu'elle justifie en soutenant que l'appelant n'a pas présenté d'argument suffisant pour que la garde lui soit accordée, et que ceux qui l'auraient soutenu financièrement se sont servis du présent pourvoi à des fins de promotion et de publicité de la «cause» des Témoins de Jéhovah, ce qui a ajouté des frais inutiles.
The respondent requests costs on a solicitor-client basis, which she justifies by submitting that the appellant did not raise a meritorious argument that he receive custody, and that those allegedly financing him have used this appeal as a means of promoting and gaining publicity for the "cause" of the Jehovah's Witness faith, adding unnecessary expense.  I am not entirely unsympathetic to the respondent's concerns, to the extent that the appellant here made allegations which were not directly relevant to the outcome of this particular case.  I do not find, however, that these actions on the part of the appellant were sufficiently egregious as to permit the award of solicitor-client costs.  I refer to the discussion of the propriety of such an award in Young.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Il a conclu que [traduction] « [l]a communauté dans son ensemble et les participants à l’instance criminelle, qu’il s’agisse des accusés, des témoins, des jurés ou des enquêteurs, sont mieux servis par un processus permettant que toutes les questions soient résolues dans un même procès » (par. 59).
[21] On the Crown’s view that attempted murder is not an included offence to murder, it would follow that if the jury had acquitted the respondents of murder, the Crown could have proceeded at a subsequent trial on a charge of attempted murder.  The contrary view, that attempted murder is an included offence, is supported by Doherty J.A.’s meticulous analysis of the relevant Criminal Code provisions (ss. 660 to 662) and related case law.  He concluded that “[t]he community as a whole and the participants in a criminal proceeding, be they accused, witness, juror, or investigator, are best served by a process that allows all issues to be resolved in a single trial” (para. 59).  I cannot improve on his analysis and I will not repeat it.  I note that Moldaver J.A. agreed that the potential verdict of attempted murder should have been left with the jury and that it was an error of law not to do so.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Tout en reconnaissant que l’emprisonnement avec sursis était une sanction généralement plus propice à la réalisation des objectifs correctifs de réinsertion sociale du délinquant, de réparation des torts causés et de prise de conscience par le délinquant de ses responsabilités, le juge en chef Lamer a indiqué que les objectifs de dissuasion et de dénonciation pouvaient être bien servis par une peine d’emprisonnement avec sursis.
32 The Chief Justice discussed how the sentencing objectives, outlined in s. 718(a) to (f), related to this interpretation of the provision’s dual purpose.  While recognizing that a conditional sentence is generally better suited to achieve the restorative objectives of rehabilitation, reparations, and promotion of a sense of responsibility in the offender, Lamer C.J. indicated that the objectives of deterrence and denunciation could be well served with a conditional sentence.  Indeed, he noted that certain conditions can create more onerous circumstances than those associated with incarceration (at para. 105).
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Ils ont aussi produit des éléments de preuve établissant que la chasse nocturne particulière faisant l’objet de leur inculpation n’était pas dangereuse. Ils se sont fait prendre par des agents de conservation provinciaux, qui se sont servis d’un leurre mécanique en forme de cerf à queue noire.
10 Morris and Olsen led evidence to the effect that  night hunting is part of the Tsartlip tradition and has been carried on in safety for generations. They also introduced evidence that the particular night hunt for which they were charged was not dangerous. Morris and Olsen were caught by provincial conservation officers using a mechanical black-tailed deer decoy.  The decoy was set up on unoccupied lands 20 metres off a gravel road.  It was, one of the conservation officers testified, a spot chosen for its safety.  Officer Gerald Brunham explained the choice of site as follows:
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[18] Les facteurs relevés par les tribunaux ne sont pas exhaustifs. Ils aident seulement à dégager la façon dont les intérêts de la justice peuvent être servis dans un cas particulier et à éviter qu’une injustice soit commise.
[18] The factors identified by the courts are not exhaustive. They simply help capture how the interests of justice may be served in a particular case, avoiding an injustice. Factors courts rightly use include: the general prejudice to the accused; the legal and factual nexus between the counts; the complexity of the evidence; whether the accused intends to testify on one count but not another; the possibility of inconsistent verdicts; the desire to avoid a multiplicity of proceedings; the use of similar fact evidence at trial; the length of the trial having regard to the evidence to be called; the potential prejudice to the accused with respect to the right to be tried within a reasonable time; and the existence of antagonistic defences as between co‑accused persons: R. v. E. (L.) (1994), 94 C.C.C. (3d) 228 (Ont. C.A.), at p. 238; R. v. Cross (1996), 112 C.C.C. (3d) 410 (Que. C.A.), at p. 419; R. v. Cuthbert (1996), 106 C.C.C. (3d) 28 (B.C.C.A.), at para. 9, aff’d [1997] 1 S.C.R. 8 (sub nom. R. v. C. (D.A.)).
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L'appelant a expliqué, en témoignant au procès, que plusieurs de ses amis passaient souvent la nuit chez lui après des parties ou après s'être servis de la piste de moto‑cross qui se trouvait à proximité de la maison.
Upon discovering the identity of the new resident, the municipal police of Ste-Marthe-sur-le-Lac began to keep a watch on the house.  Then on May 15, 1984, at approximately 07:35 a.m., the police came to the house armed with two warrants:  the first warrant issued by the Court of Sessions of the Peace at Sherbrooke for the arrest of the accused on unrelated charges, and the second a search warrant issued by a local justice of the peace to search for stolen property.  The exact number of police officers present at that search is not clear from the record and the trial judge did not make a finding of fact on the point.  One of the police officers testified that there were [TRANSLATION] "several police officers, several police forces also", while another testified that:  [TRANSLATION] "When we got there, we were alone in a van with officer Beaudoin:  Mr. Caron [another police officer], myself and a police officer from St‑Eustache who was driving."  For his part, when asked how many police cars were present, the appellant replied:  [TRANSLATION] "On the morning of May 15, I saw perhaps fifteen or twenty."
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Si les préoccupations habituelles, telles que la multiplicité des poursuites, sont absentes ou, en fait, si, comme en l'espèce, les circonstances particulières indiquent que les intérêts de l'économie judiciaire seraient mieux servis par la reconnaissance de la qualité pour agir, on ne gagne rien en refusant de la reconnaître sous prétexte qu'il existe un autre moyen de vérifier la constitutionnalité de la mesure législative en cause.
Fourth, in resolving the question of standing, following Thorson, the Court should take a purposive and functional rather than categorical approach to standing and resort should be made to the concerns underlying restrictions on standing.  If the usual concerns, such as a multiplicity of suits, are not present, or indeed if the circumstances of the case indicate, as they do here, that the interests of judicial economy would actually be best served by awarding standing, nothing is gained by denying standing because another avenue to test the constitutionality of the legislation potentially exists.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Il se peut que les intérêts d’une jeune nation en voie de développement soient mieux servis en réduisant les obstacles à la croissance industrielle et à l’expansion économique, mais au sein d’une nation plus développée et populeuse, ce laisser‑aller doit céder le pas à l’intérêt légitime qu’entretient la société à l’égard d’autres préoccupations fondamentales telles que la sécurité et le bien‑être des enfants.
The past seventy years have wrought many changes within Canada and today one might perhaps be inclined to question the relevance and validity of a rule of law which limits the common law duty of care of a railway to the special case or the exceptional case, particularly if those words are to receive a strict or narrow construction.  It may well be that the interests of a young and undeveloped nation are best served by a minimum of impediment to industrial growth and economic expansion but in a more developed and populous nation this attitude of laissez faire may have to yield to accommodate the legitimate concern of society for other vital interests such as the safety and welfare of children.
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Si le demandeur n’est pas en mesure de renoncer librement et volontairement à l’exercice de son droit et est incapable d’agir en raison de l’emprise psychologique qu’a sur lui le défendeur par la crainte qu’il lui inspire, ni l’ordre, ni l’intérêt publics, ni même une légitime sécurité des rapports juridiques, que la prescription vise à favoriser, ne seront servis.
67                      It is a logical extension of these civil law rules and principles that the psychological state of fear will also suspend prescription in delictual matters where the fear is caused by the defendant’s fault.  Prescription is based, inter alia, on a presumption that the holder of a right waives the exercise thereof if he or she is not diligent in asserting it.  If the plaintiff is not in a position to freely and voluntarily waive the exercise of his or her right and is unable to act owing to the psychological hold the defendant has over the plaintiff by inspiring fear in him or her, neither public order nor the public interest, nor even a legitimate security of legal relations, which prescription is intended to foster, will be served.  Quite the contrary. As Professor Langevin stated, supra, at p. 272 of her article:
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La demanderesse mineure, Diane Teno (DT), enfant âgée de quatre ans et demi, a traversé la rue avec son frère âgé de six ans (avec la permission de sa mère, Yvonne Teno (YT) qui lui avait aussi donné de l’argent pour acheter de la crème glacée d’un camion appartenant à la défenderesse J.B. Jackson Limited (J) et conduit par le défendeur Stuart Galloway (G). Les enfants ont été servis au guichet de service du côté droit du camion.
The infant plaintiff, Diane Teno (DT), a four-and-a-half-year-old child, crossed a street with her six-year-old brother (having first obtained permission and money from her mother, Yvonne Teno (YT) to make a purchase from an ice cream vending truck owned by the defendant J.B. Jackson Limited (J) and operated by the defendant Stuart Galloway (G). The children were served at a service window of the truck on the curb (right) side. The infant plaintiff was served first and while G was serving her brother, DT left to return to the opposite side of the street. After passing around the front of the truck, she was struck by a car owned by the defendant Wallace Arnold (WA) and driven by the defendant Brian Arnold (BA). The car had been approaching from the rear but was not seen by G through his rear windows as, at the time, he was reaching into the freezer to fill the order of DT’s brother. As a result of the injuries sustained by DT, her mobility was seriously lessened although technically she was not paralyzed, and she suffered a considerable degree of mental impairment.
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11f) cadre mieux avec l'objet de cette disposition à supposer que cet objet consiste vraiment à protéger les intérêts de l'accusé. Les intérêts de l'accusé sembleraient mieux servis si l'on considérait que l'al.
In other words, the intent of the provision could be to guarantee an accused the benefit of a jury trial where a jury trial is in fact from his or her perspective a benefit but not to impose it on the accused when it is not.  In my view, this latter interpretation of the s. 11(f) right is more in tune with the purpose of the provision if that purpose is correctly perceived as being to protect the interests of the accused.  The accused's interests would seem to be better served by construing s. 11(f) as conferring a "benefit" on the accused which can be waived by him if it seems to be in his best interests to do so.  To compel an accused to accept a jury trial when he or she considers a jury trial a burden rather than a benefit would appear, in Frankfurter J.'s words, "to imprison a man in his privileges and call it the Constitution":  see Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269 (1942), at p. 280.  I fully recognize that a right to waive a jury trial is not specifically spelled out in s. 11(f);  it has to be implied.  Nevertheless, it seems to me that this is the only approach to the interpretation of s. 11(f) which attaches real significance to the presence of the word "benefit" in the section and at the same time provides the individual with the full measure of the protection which it appears the accused was intended to receive under the section:  R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295.
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Subjectivement, c'est ce qu'il peut croire avec le recul; cependant, nous doutons que les intérêts de la justice soient servis si l'on place le médecin à la merci de l'amertume et de la désillusion du patient.
66               In determining that Ms. Hollis would not have opted to undergo the implantation, my colleague refers to the evidence of experts in the field of breast implant surgery.  In support of his position, La Forest J. (at para. 48) relies on the evidence of two plastic surgeons who "gave testimony concerning whether a reasonable woman in Ms. Hollis' position would have consented to the surgery if properly warned".  The Buchan subjective test, however, places no reliance on evidence as to what a reasonable woman would do.  The exposition of the subjective test which my colleague adopts is set out in the following passage from Buchan, at p. 381, part of which is reproduced in La Forest J.'s decision:
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Nous nous sommes servis du terme « établissement » parce que l’on s’en sert dans le Code du travail et qu’il y a toute une série de dispositions de jurisprudence, relatives tant à la Loi sur les relations de travail qu’aux tribunaux, portant sur l’utilisation de ce mot.
We used “establishment” because it has been used in the Labour Code, and there is a body of case law, both of the Labour Relations Act and of the Courts, relating to the use of those words. It was a word that caused some concern among some presenting briefs, in that employers could divide their establishments in order to set up different wage scales in those establishments. Therefore, it was urged that we use the words “same employer” but that creates real difficulties in terms of regional wage scales and regional and geographic factors.
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Il s'agit donc, dans cette deuxième étape, de déterminer si une atteinte aux droits individuels est nécessaire à l'accomplissement du devoir des agents de la paix, et si elle est raisonnable, compte tenu des intérêts d'ordre public servis par, d'un côté, la répression efficace des agissements criminels, et de l'autre, le respect de la liberté et de la dignité fondamentale des individus.
It is therefore necessary in this second stage to determine whether an invasion of individual rights is necessary in order for the peace officers to perform their duty, and whether such an invasion is reasonable in light of the public purposes served by effective control of criminal acts on the one hand and on the other respect for the liberty and fundamental dignity of individuals.
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Comme je l’ai indiqué précédemment, la question à laquelle il faut répondre en l’espèce n’est pas de savoir si l’appelant et le public seraient mieux servis si l’appelant purgeait sa peine dans un hôpital, mais plutôt si les conditions donnant ouverture au prononcé d’une condamnation à l’emprisonnement avec sursis sont réunies dans la présente affaire.
90 Thus, while I would not deny that the hospital is also a part of our community, I cannot conclude that one can look solely to the community where the offender is to reside when determining whether the condition precedent is satisfied.  In my view, the community with which a sentencing judge must be concerned consists of all persons who could be at risk of being harmed by the offender.  In light of the Proulx decision, I conclude that if there is a danger to any person by the offender serving the sentence in the community, whether that person be a resident of the psychiatric hospital or in the public at large, then a conditional sentence should not be imposed.
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Ni l’une ni l’autre des théories ne permet à elle seule de parvenir à une loi équitable en matière de pension alimentaire au profit d’un époux. L’importance des objectifs de politique générale servis par les deux modèles est incontestable.
32 Both the mutual obligation model and the independent, clean-break model represent important realities and address significant policy concerns and social values. The federal and provincial legislatures, through their respective statutes, have acknowledged both models.  Neither theory alone is capable of achieving a just law of spousal support.  The importance of the policy objectives served by both models is beyond dispute.  It is critical to recognize and encourage the self-sufficiency and independence of each spouse.  It is equally vital to recognize that divorced people may move on to other relationships and acquire new obligations which they may not be able to meet if they are obliged to maintain full financial burdens from previous relationships.  On the other hand, it is also important to recognize that sometimes the goals of actual independence are impeded by patterns of marital dependence, that too often self-sufficiency at the time of marriage termination is an impossible aspiration, and that marriage is an economic partnership that is built upon a premise (albeit rebuttable) of mutual support.  The real question in such cases is whether the state should automatically bear the costs of these realities, or whether the family, including former spouses, should be asked to contribute to the need, means permitting.  Some suggest it would be better if the state automatically picked up the costs of such cases: Rogerson, “Judicial Interpretation of the Spousal and Child Support Provisions of the Divorce Act, 1985 (Part I)”, supra, at p. 234,  n. 172.  However, as will be seen, Parliament and the legislatures have decreed otherwise by requiring courts to consider not only compensatory factors, but the “needs” and “means” of the parties.  It is not a question of either one model or the other.  It is rather a matter of applying the relevant factors and striking the balance that best achieves justice in the particular case before the court.
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