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Trybunał podkreślał również, że w demokratycznym państwie prawa prawo karne musi być oparte m.in. na zasadzie określoności czynów zabronionych pod groźbą kary. Nakazuje ona ustawodawcy takie wskazanie czynu zabronionego (jego znamion), aby zarówno dla adresata normy prawnokarnej, jak i organów stosujących prawo i dokonujących „odkodowania” treści regulacji w drodze wykładni normy prawa karnego nie budziło wątpliwości to, czy określone zachowanie in concreto wypełnia te znamiona.
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The tribunal has also stressed that in a democracy under the rule of law, criminal law must be based on the principle of determinacy, that is, a clear definition of punishable acts. This requires the Parliament to define the elements of an offence so that there are no doubts among the persons to whom the rule is directed, or the authorities enforcing the law and interpreting the content of the rule, whether specific behaviour fulfils the elements of the crime. As pointed out by Prof. Lech Gardocki, First President of the Polish Supreme Court, under the rule of law there should be no criminal laws in force which cannot be formulated precisely by the Parliament or via the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court (L. Gardocki, Prawo karne (Criminal Law), 9th ed., Warsaw 2003). Thus, as stated by scholars, while a norm of criminal law may contain a reference to other rules, vagueness of any element, which could lead to discretion in enforcement of the law and punishment of behaviour that is not expressly prohibited, must be avoided (K. Buchała & A. Zoll, Polskie prawo karne (Polish Criminal Law), Warsaw 1995, pp. 50–51).
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