lis – -Translation – Keybot Dictionary

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  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Plus la loi se rapproche d’un paradigme judiciaire conventionnel mettant en cause un pur lis inter partes dont l’issue est largement tranchée par les faits présentés devant le tribunal, moins la cour de révision est tenue à la déférence.
32 In contrast, a piece of legislation or a statutory provision that essentially seeks to resolve disputes or determine rights between two parties will demand less deference.  The more the legislation approximates a conventional judicial paradigm involving a pure lis inter partes determined largely by the facts before the tribunal, the less deference the reviewing court will tend to show.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Bien que les affaires constitutionnelles tirent souvent leur origine d'un lis entre particuliers, il arrive parfois qu'un organisme public se trouve interposé entre les parties, telle la Commission en l'espèce.
54.              Although constitutional cases are often the result of a lis between private litigants, they sometimes involve some public authority interposed between the litigants, such as the Board in the case at bar. In other constitutional cases, the controversy or the lis, if it can be called a lis, will arise directly between a private litigant and the State represented by some public authority; Morgentaler v. Ackroyd (1983), 42 O.R. 659.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Il n’est pas nécessaire qu’un organisme soit une cour de justice ou qu’il soit saisi d’un lis inter partes quelconque pour qu’il doive agir de façon judiciaire: R. v. Manchester Legal Aid Committee, ex parte R.A. Brand & Co.
It is not necessary that a body should be a court of law or that it have before it a form of lis inter partes before it falls under a duty to act judicially: R. v. Manchester Legal Aid Committee, ex parte R.A. Brand & Co. Ltd.[7]. The cases show that such a duty may rest upon an administrative body deciding whether to expel an unruly student, or ordering the destruction of a dilapidated house, or ousting a member from a private club. A tribunal may be required to act judicially although entitled to act on its own knowledge and information, without evidence unless submitted and without a hearing: R. v. Brighton and Area Rent Tribunal[8].
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Cet article prévoit que, 60 jours après la signification de cet avis à l’opposant, l’opposition devient caduque à moins que, dans ce délai, des procédures sur opposition soient intentées et un certificat de lis pendens soit déposé au greffe.
On April 9, 1974, Sunderland had filed a caveat against the lands, and this was followed on May 27, 1974, by a “Notice to Caveator to take Proceedings on Caveat” pursuant to s. 144 of The Land Titles Act of Alberta, R.S.A. 1970, c. 198, which was sent to McFarland. That section provides that, 60 days after service of such notice on the caveator, the caveat will lapse unless, within that time, proceedings on the caveat are taken and a certificate of lis pendens is filed with the Registrar.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Bien que les affaires constitutionnelles tirent souvent leur origine d'un lis entre particuliers, il arrive parfois qu'un organisme public se trouve interposé entre les parties, telle la Commission en l'espèce.
54.              Although constitutional cases are often the result of a lis between private litigants, they sometimes involve some public authority interposed between the litigants, such as the Board in the case at bar. In other constitutional cases, the controversy or the lis, if it can be called a lis, will arise directly between a private litigant and the State represented by some public authority; Morgentaler v. Ackroyd (1983), 42 O.R. 659.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
L’opposition de McFarland est devenue caduque le 26 juillet 1974 car, bien qu’il ait intenté des procédures à la suite de l’avis envoyé par Sunderland le 27 mai 1974, il n’a pas déposé de certificat de lis pendens comme l’exige l’art.
It will be recalled that McFarland had filed a caveat on March 21, 1974. Sunderland filed a caveat on April 9, 1974. McFarland’s caveat lapsed on July 26, 1974, because, although he had taken proceedings pursuant to Sunderland’s notice on May 27, 1974, pursuant to s. 144 of The Land Titles Act he failed to file a lis pendens as required by that section.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
L’opposition de McF est devenue caduque le 26 juillet 1974 parce que, bien qu’il eût intenté une action suite à l’avis de S du 27 mai 1974, conformément à l’art. 144 de The Land Titles Act, R.S.A. 1970, chap. 198, il avait omis de déposer un certificat de lis pendens comme l’exige cet article.
S had filed a caveat on April 9, 1974. McF’s caveat lapsed on July 26, 1974, because, although he took proceedings pursuant to S’s notice on May 27, 1974, pursuant to s. 144 of The Land Titles Act, R.S.A. 1970, c. 198, he failed to file a lis pendens as required by that section.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Je ne vois pas comment on a pu statuer qu’il ne s’agissait pas d’une «mésentente relative à l’interprétation ou à l’application d’une convention collective» quand je lis dans les motifs (à la p. 867):
He cited the decision of the Court of Appeal of Quebec in L’Association des Policiers de Giffard v. La Cité de Giffard[4]. The case arose out of an arbitration award having the effect of a collective agreement. There was disagreement on the interpretation of this award and its retroactive application. I cannot see how it may have been decided that there was no “disagreement respecting the interpretation or application of a collective agreement”, when I read in the reasons (at p. 867):
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
L’exposé de demande et la transaction constituent une preuve par ouï-dire en matière d’ascendance ou d’antécédents familiaux et les déclarations sont ante litem motam. En 1946, il n’y avait aucune «lis mota» touchant l’ascendance de P ou le statut matrimonial de sa mère.
The law recognized, as one of the numerous exceptions to the hearsay rule, the hearsay of deceased relatives in proof of matters of pedigree. The statement of claim and agreement were hearsay respecting pedigree or family history and the declarations were ante litem motam. In 1946 there was no “lis mota” affecting the pedigree of P or relating to the marital status of her mother. There was nothing to incline G to falsehood in casting herself in the role of housekeeper and employee, and every reason for R to plead marriage in defence of the claim if the facts had supported such a plea. No such defence was raised.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
En ce qui concerne la contribution de l’épouse en secondes noces, je souligne au départ qu’elle n’est pas antérieure à 1975, époque du remariage de l’époux. A ce moment-là, la propriété était grevée d’un avis de lis pendens inscrit par l’épouse depuis quatre ans.
This must be so notwithstanding the fact that he co-operated, to put it mildly, in causing this defective provision in the order of the trial court. We know that this payment amounted to $5,916.69, and in any final accounting the husband should receive a credit for this contribution before the division of the proceeds of any sale or other dividing processes are determined. As for the contribution said to have been made by the “new wife”, may it be observed at the outset that this was made not before some date in 1975, that being the time of the husband’s second marriage. By this time the property had been subject to a lis pendens filed by the wife for four years. The evidence as to
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Mais moi‑même, si je lis l’exposé des faits, il y a certains aspects de ces faits qui ne sont pas acceptables pour l’accusé, alors nous sommes dans la situation où je suis susceptible de nuire au plaidoyer de non-culpabilité.
CROWN: The only problems [sic] that I can foresee Your Honour, as My Friend says, that would be the argument on Section eighty-three is a legal argument, rather than an argument on the factual situation. But I—if I read the facts in, there’s certain aspects of that fact that are not acceptable to the Accused, then we’re in a position that I—I may prejudice the not guilty plea.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Bien que les affaires constitutionnelles tirent souvent leur origine d'un lis entre particuliers, il arrive parfois qu'un organisme public se trouve interposé entre les parties, telle la Commission en l'espèce.
54.              Although constitutional cases are often the result of a lis between private litigants, they sometimes involve some public authority interposed between the litigants, such as the Board in the case at bar. In other constitutional cases, the controversy or the lis, if it can be called a lis, will arise directly between a private litigant and the State represented by some public authority; Morgentaler v. Ackroyd (1983), 42 O.R. 659.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
[TRADUCTION] Q. 220 Je lis: «À aucun moment on n’a demandé à M. Canning de confirmer, pas plus qu’on n’a déclaré que la dépréciation inscrite au bilan était égale à l’allocation du coût en capital indiquée dans la déclaration d’impôt».
Q. 220 And if I can read, ‘At no time was Mr. Canning asked to confirm nor was it indicated that the depreciation shown on the balance sheet was the same as the capital cost allowance shown on the income tax return.’ Is that statement correct, Mr. Taylor?
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
De la façon dont je lis les jugements des tribunaux d’instance inférieure, et particulièrement celui de la Cour d’appel, l’arbitre aurait commis une erreur parce qu’il a reçu une preuve
As I read the judgments below, and especially that in the Court of Appeal, the arbitrator was faulted because he admitted extrinsic evidence on the basis of the existence of an ambiguity.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Quand je lis les premier et quatrième considérants et les conclusions de la sixième recommandation et quand je me rappelle que le seul but de ces rapports est de présenter des faits et des recommandations d’après lesquels normalement le Ministre agira, l’argument qu’aucun droit n’a été défini et que rien n’a été décidé est pur sophisme.
Appellant has rendered a decision that may well impair if not destroy Respondent’s reputation and future. When I read the first and fourth considerants and the conclusions of the sixth recommendation and when I recall that the whole purpose of these reports is to present facts and recommendations on which normally the Minister will act the argument that no rights have been determined and that nothing has been decided is pure sophistry.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Avant rentrée en vigueur de cette loi, elle avait introduit, en 1971, ce qu’on a appelé une action fondée sur une fiducie alors qu’elle était encore officiellement mariée à l’intimé et un avis de lis pendens a en conséquence été enregistrée contre la propriété.
The appellant brought her action under the Family Relations Act, 1972 (B.C.), c. 20, on May 9, 1975. Prior to the enactment of this statute, she had commenced a so-called trust action in 1971 when she was still formally married to the respondent, and a lis pendens was registered against the property in that action. It has, however, remained dormant and she later sought relief under s. 8 of the Family Relations Act, which reads as follows:
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Q. Toujours dans la déclaration, je lis, on emploie la première personne: «J’ai clairement indiqué…», c’est le maire qui parle, «j’ai clairement indiqué que cette position, savoir que le conseil pouvait décider la question de la 40e Avenue (la fermer ou la laisser ouverte) indépendamment de celle du centre commercial, devait être claire pour le conseil…» A-t-on dit cela?
Q. Going on with the statement and reading it, it is in the first person: “I made it clear…” that is the Mayor, “I made it clear that this position, that council could deal with 40th Avenue (close it or leave it open) independently of the shopping centre must be made clear to council…” was that said?
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Q. Pour vous tenir au courant de l’évolution de sa condition, c’est toujours votre paragraphe sept (7) que je lis?
Q. To keep you advised of the progress of her condition—I am still reading from your paragraph seven (7)?
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
R. Je vais essayer de m’exprimer autrement: lorsque je lis 3,000 pieds, ce chiffre ne m’indique pas, à moins de faire des calculs, la proportion du tambour occupée par le câble, mais en consultant les caractéristiques, je vois qu’il peut contenir 0510 tours, ce qui correspond environ aux deux tiers du tambour.
A. Perhaps I could put it otherwise: I look at the 3,000 feet and I do not know from that number, unless I do some calculations, how much of the drum is full of cable, but I can look at the specifications and notice that it will carry 0510 wraps, that is about two thirds full. I can read those numbers directly from the specifications and I would conclude that if it will carry 180 kips two thirds full it will certainly carry 40 kips full. So there is my logic.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
[TRADUCTION] La première phrase, comme je la lis, signifie que le Juge en chef estime que la preuve n’était pas suffisante pour étayer une condamnation,—et ceci est une question de fait…
I read the first sentence as meaning that the Chief Justice considered that the evidence was not sufficient to support a conviction,—which is a question of fact…
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Q. Bien, le dossier dit remboîtement à deux ou trois occasions mais peut-être que je ne lis pas bien. On lit remboîté le 19 octobre ′65, remboîté le 1er juin 1966. Remboîté le 26 septembre ′67. Papillon d’inspection, c’est bien ça—le 1er septembre ′67.
Q. Well, it says resocketing on two or three occasions but maybe I am not reading it correctly. It says resocketed October the 19th, ‘65, resocketed 1st June of 1966. Resocketed September 26th, ‘67. Inspection tags, is that it—September the 1st, ‘67. Resocketed October the 13th, ‘67. What do all those notations mean in that?
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Je pourrais ajouter que les transformateurs sont réputés exonérés de la taxe de vente en vertu de l’exonération fédérale susmentionnée. Dans Sales Tax Guide, Canada (29e éd.), publié par CCH Canadienne Limitée, je lis au paragraphe 62-520:
I might add that transformers are considered exempt from sales tax under the federal exemption previously mentioned. In the Sales Tax Guide, Canada (29th ed.), published by CCH Canadian Limited, I read at paragraph 62-520:
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
L’existence d’un élément assimilable à un lis inter partes et la présence de procédures, fonctions et actes équivalents à ceux d’un tribunal ajoutent du poids au par. (3). Mais encore une fois, l’absence de règles de procédure analogues à celles des tribunaux ne sera pas fatale à l’existence d’une obligation d’agir judiciairement.
The existence of something in the nature of a lis inter partes and the presence of procedures, functions and happenings approximating those of a court add weight to (3). But, again, the absence of procedural rules analogous to those of courts will not be fatal to the presence of a duty to act judicially.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Le 31 mai 1974, McFarland a intenté une action contre Hauser et Sunderland. Il a omis de déposer un certificat de lis pendens et, en conséquence, son opposition est devenue caduque. Contre Hauser, il demandait que soit déclaré son droit d’être enregistré comme propriétaire des terres moyennant le versement de $190,000 à ce dernier.
McFarland, on May 31, 1974, brought action against Hauser and Sunderland. He neglected to file a certificate of lis pendens, and, as a result, his caveat lapsed. In his action he claimed, as against Hauser, a declaration that he was entitled to be registered owner of the lands upon payment of $190,000 to Hauser. As against Sunderland he asked for a declaration that Sunderland’s caveat be removed from the title.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Les termes de l’art. 7, tel que je le lis, couvrent les fiduciaires étrangers et la compagnie Canada Trust et les obligent à faire une déclaration. Sous ce rapport, je note que la définition que la Loi donne du mot «personne» comprend un fiduciaire et que le terme n’est pas limité aux fiduciaires de la Colombie‑Britannique.
I return, accordingly, to ss. 7, 16 and 17 of the Logging Tax Act. I read s. 7 as bringing the foreign trustees and Canada Trust Company within its terms so as to come under the obligation to make a return. In this connection I note that “person” is defined in the Act to include a trustee, and the term is not limited to British Columbia trustees. Sections 16 and 17 add to the obligation of the foreign trustees and of Canada Trust Company. I do not think that I would be justified in excluding from the scope of those sections, and especially from the scope of s. 16, trustees or administrators whose only duty may be to turn over to their respective beneficiaries property in which the trustees or administrators have the legal title. The concluding words of s. 16, requiring payment of any tax “before making any distribution of such property”, point sufficiently to their inclusion.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Il importe peu qu’il y ait ou non lis inter partes, au sens judiciaire traditionnel, à une audience devant l’Office pour l’octroi d’un certificat, puisque l’Office est tenu d’appliquer des normes légales à toute demande et, de fait, puisqu’il est en présence, en l’espèce, de demande en conflit, la similitude avec un lis s’accentue.
Of course, the functions of the Board are different from the functions of an applicant or group of applicants for a board certificate, just as the functions of a court are different from those of a litigant seeking a favourable decision. It does not matter whether or not there is a lis inter partes, in a traditional court sense, in a Board hearing for the grant of a certificate, so long as the Board is required to apply statutory standards to any application, and, indeed where there are, as here, competing applications the resemblance to a lis is increased. An applicant seeking a certificate must inevitably direct itself to the statutory prescriptions by which the Board is governed, taking into consideration of course, the scope of discretion which those standards permit. To say, therefore, that the issues before the Board are different than those to which the Study Group directed itself is not entirely correct, save as it reflects the different roles of the Board and of the Study Group. Moreover, it does not meet the central issue in this case, namely, whether the presiding member of a panel hearing an application under s. 44 can be said to be free from any reasonable apprehension of bias on his part when he had a hand in developing and approving important underpinnings of the very application which eventually was brought before the panel.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Avant l’entrée en vigueur de cette loi, elle avait introduit, en 1971, ce qu’on a appelé une action fondée sur une fiducie alors qu’elle était encore officiellement mariée à l’intimé et un avis de lis pendens a en conséquence été enregistré contre la propriété.
The appellant brought her action under the Family Relations Act, 1972 (B.C.), c. 20, on May 9, 1975. Prior to the enactment of this statute, she had commenced a so-called trust action in 1971 when she was still formally married to the respondent, and a lis pendens was registered against the property in that action. It, however, remained dormant and she later sought relief under s. 8 of the Family Relations Act.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
J’arrive maintenant à l’argument selon lequel Bay lis et Dwyer, en tant que complices après le fait, sont des complices et que le jury aurait dû être averti du danger de fonder un verdict de culpabilité sur leur témoignage non corroboré.
I come now to the argument that both Baylis and Dwyer, as accessories after the fact, were accomplices and that the jury should have been instructed on the danger of convicting on their evidence in the absence of corroboration. As men-
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Toutefois, il ne s'agit pas, à mon avis, d'un facteur unique, ni d'un facteur nécessaire. Comme il a été dit à d'autres occasions, les procédures devant le Conseil, dans une audience de fixation de tarif, n'est pas de nature contradictoire; il n'y a pas de lis inter partes.
I use the word "necessarily" because I have no doubt that an element which may be considered by the tribunal in determining the entitlement of a party appearing before it to costs, is whether or not the party has incurred liability for expenses for the purpose of its appearance before the tribunal. It is not, however, in my view, either the only or a necessary element. As has been said on other occasions, the proceedings before the Commission in a rate fixing hearing are not adversarial in nature; there is no lis inter partes. The purpose of a hearing in such a proceeding is to obtain meaningful reaction from concerned and interested parties affected by the rate fixing, whether adversely or positively. Such parties may or may not have incurred actual, measurable expenses, such as counsel fees, in providing input to the proceedings and yet have contributed in a very real fashion to a better understanding by the Commission of some of the issues involved in the proposed rate structure. Such contributions to a better understanding of the issues should, as I see it, be encouraged and rewarded. If this is so, obviously such encouragement cannot be based solely on indemnification for actual costs incurred. It is at this point that the Commission's discretion as to who is deserving of an award of costs, as to the elements to be considered and the principles to be applied in the award, is exercised in any of the ways contemplated by section 73.
  Cour suprême du Canada ...  
Il importe peu qu’il y ait ou non lis inter partes, au sens judiciaire traditionnel, à une audience devant l’Office pour l’octroi d’un certificat, puisque l’Office est tenu d’appliquer des normes légales à toute demande et, de fait, puisqu’il est en présence, en l’espèce, de demande en conflit, la similitude avec un lis s’accentue.
Of course, the functions of the Board are different from the functions of an applicant or group of applicants for a board certificate, just as the functions of a court are different from those of a litigant seeking a favourable decision. It does not matter whether or not there is a lis inter partes, in a traditional court sense, in a Board hearing for the grant of a certificate, so long as the Board is required to apply statutory standards to any application, and, indeed where there are, as here, competing applications the resemblance to a lis is increased. An applicant seeking a certificate must inevitably direct itself to the statutory prescriptions by which the Board is governed, taking into consideration of course, the scope of discretion which those standards permit. To say, therefore, that the issues before the Board are different than those to which the Study Group directed itself is not entirely correct, save as it reflects the different roles of the Board and of the Study Group. Moreover, it does not meet the central issue in this case, namely, whether the presiding member of a panel hearing an application under s. 44 can be said to be free from any reasonable apprehension of bias on his part when he had a hand in developing and approving important underpinnings of the very application which eventually was brought before the panel.
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