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Par le nombre élevé d’États ayant accepté le Protocole I, comme, dans une mesure légèrement moindre, le Protocole II, par l’influence inéluctable que certaines règles des Protocoles ont eue et continueront à avoir sur la pratique des États non liés, il est évident qu’aujourd’hui l’essentiel de ces traités reflète l’état du droit coutumier universel.
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One of the arguments quite justifiably put forward by certain analysts, concerned that the United States has not ratified Protocol I, is that there is a risk of seeing the establishment of a form of “American” customary law, somewhat different from the treaty-based law adhered to by most of the international community. On the other hand, these authors go on to say, if the United States acceded to the Protocol, it would be able to make whatever interpretative declarations and reservations it considered necessary. In view of the country’s weight on the international scene, these would be instrumental in shaping customary rules for the universal application of treaty-based norms within a single coherent framework, that of the Protocol [30 ] . Theodor Meron goes even further when he says that “by remaining aloof, the United States may be abdicating its historical leadership in the shaping of the law of war” [31 ] . His remarks about the United States appear to us equally relevant with regard to some other non-participating powers. These include the United Kingdom, of course, which we hope will soon be depositing instruments of ratification, and especially the major Asian countries, such as India, Indonesia and Japan. If international humanitarian law is to achieve a greater degree of stability and universa lity, a commitment on their part to the Protocols is a must.
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